



Report

**From the 3rd local seminar in Katowice,
13-14 November 2006**

Organised within the project

***SecuCities* Cities against Terrorism**

Training local representatives in facing terrorism

By
The University of Silesia
and
The European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS) in Paris

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What is terrorism? How this multi-dimensional phenomena, *signum temporis* of the beginning of XXI century, can influence not only the life of the whole nations, but also the small local communities? How the local authorities can confront this threat and raise awareness among the population? How can they prevent terrorism, especially through improving community relations, which is very important in ethnically differentiated local societies? Where is a border between justified security needs and civil liberties? Especially how we can avoid prejudice and intercultural hatred or violence in case of terrorist attack? What is the best system of crisis management and coordination of emergency responses? How to developed close cooperation between local authorities and police or law enforcement agencies, model of which can be imitated in different European countries? How should we support victims of terrorist outrages and build solidarity at local level?

This is only a few questions which were addressed during two days international seminar at University of Silesia (Katowice, Poland). The seminar was organized as a part of international project “Cities against Terrorism” managed by European Forum for Urban Safety (EFUS) and financed by EU Commission. This report analyses main topics discussed during the event and summarises the outcomes of the seminar. Internal structure of the report is adequate to the division the seminar was based on. At the beginning it is necessary to provide some rudimentary information about the seminar such as its aim, target group and seminar’s format. This information should be simultaneously accompanied by the close look at the organization of local self-government in Poland, which is essential for a proper understanding of the context of Polish seminar. Then we can pass to the analyses of the paramount subjects which were debated in Katowice. This is the most spacious part of the seminar, divided, as was mentioned above and according to the seminar format, into four panels. Such distinction origins from the starting foundations of the seminar based on the division between three important links: a) situation *before* terrorist acts (this link covers such topics like prevention of terrorism and relations in multiethnic local community), b) situations *during* terrorism attacks (emergency response, crisis management and communications), and c) situations *after* the attack (solidarity with the victims and public support).

Panel I entitled “Prevention of terrorism and community relations” consists of two presentations both delivered by British experts. It is not by accident that this panel was

covered by foreign specialists. Because of mono-ethnic composition of Polish society (only about 3,5% of Polish citizens do not possess of Polish nationality), area of prevention of terrorism, is almost completely omitted in Poland. This topic is especially valuable for Polish local officials responsible for security, because it forces them to leave narrow thinking about terrorism, limited almost completely to the emergency response and crises management, and start to imagine prevention as a best protection from terrorism. Taking into account the probability of future waves of immigration to Poland this is a big psychological breakthrough. Therefore, discussion about this topic should be regarded as a real “added value” of “CAT” project in Poland. First lecture in this panel deals with the question “Designing out terrorism”. This subject is connected with perspective area of antiterrorism prevention that is specially designed architecture, common in large Western European cities and almost completely absent in Central and Eastern part of our continent. Second expert, Mr. Spencer Webster from Halton Borough Council (UK) presented British local authorities experiences at prevention of terrorism. Mr. Webster discussed wide range of different issues, but especially concentrated on following topics: 1) brief on local government structure in England; 2) local Government relationship with Central Government; 3) brief on the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Act); 4) impact of the Act on emergency services and local authorities; 5) local authority implementation of the Act; 6) terrorism – local authority emergency preparedness; 7) emergency Planning / Community Safety (“Opportunities for Improved partnership”); 8) local Government White Paper proposals (“Strong and prosperous communities”).

Panel II (“Emergency response”) and III (“Crisis management and communication systems”) analyse five lectures provided in the framework of these parts of seminar. All topics were covered by specialists recruited from practice and deal with broad range of issues, such as: the role of Police in the case of crisis situation in the context of terrorist attack; preparation of the fire-department units to the rescue actions in the event of terrorist attacks; local authorities in the face of bioterrorist attack. Methods of preparations and reactions; energetic security in the era of terrorist threat. State and local dimension; crisis management and communication in the event of terrorist attack. Presentations which are included in this part of report constitute a vast majority of topics debated during seminar. It is the reason of initial foundation that seminar in Poland should concentrate on emergency response and crisis management as predominant issues.

Panel III (“Solidarity and public support”) deals with consequences of terrorists attack. Eastern European experiences with the support of terrorism victims, especially from the specific Russian point of view were presented by the expert from Russia. For the Western

people its it is important to remember that terrorism not only cause our part of continent, but also, maybe even more commonly and brutally (as was proved for example in Bieslan and previously in Dubrovka theatre in Moscow or Kizlar), appeared in Eastern lung of Europe. Talking about support of terrorist victims, independently from material aid, we should not lose from our field of vision provided in long-term psychological help. Psychological interventions in situations involving terrorism require a fundamental understanding of the traumatic elements of terror. This issue is connected with the necessity of creation of specialised psychological teams.

At the end of the report in Conclusions were included the main suggestions flowing from seminar at University of Silesia. They were formulated with strong accent at the practical usefulness for the local authority.



INTRODUCTION – INFORMATION ABOUT SEMINAR

Title of the seminar: “LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN THE FACE OF TERRORIST THREATS.

Confronting European experiences and practical lessons for local authorities”

Date of seminar: 13–14 November 2006

Place: University of Silesia, Faculty of Law and Administration, Katowice, Bankowa 11B

The aim of seminar was elaborating, through sharing of experiences from various European countries, proper defense mechanism in a case of terrorism attack, especially in the following fields:

- prevention of terrorism
- emergency response and cooperation with authorities
- development of public solidarity with victims of terrorist acts.

Target group: local authority staff and persons locally responsible for maintaining security.

Seminar’s format: Seminar has been conducted in an interactive way. Both workshops and plenary discussions were served to share experiences and ideas.

Lecturers: international and Polish experts with big experiences in the area of combating terrorism.



Victims of terrorist acts, Pilot Project, 2005
European Commission, Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security

TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF POLAND AND ORGANISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT¹

Legal basis for the self-government creates, at the top of the hierarchy of law, Constitution of Republic of Poland passed in 1997. It includes Chapter VII entitled “Local self-government” and consists of 10 articles (art. 163-172). According to the article 163: “*Local self-government shall perform public tasks not reserved by the Constitution or statutes to the organs of other public authorities*”. Further articles generally regulate different aspects of activity of local governments (territorial organisation of local governments, legal personality, property rights, court protection of self-governing units, relations with central government, revenues of units of self-government, principles of election of representatives to the organs of local self-government, right to associate for the self-government units).

According to the law from 1998 reforming territorial division of the State, Poland (whole state area: 312,685 sq. km.) is divided into three levels of self governments, that is:

1) *Voivodship* - this Polish historical name means province, regional unit. Currently it is established 16 Voivodships. At this level of territorial division, self-government is represented by Marshal co-exist with state administration headed by *voivods* (wojewodów), who are representatives of the central government. Voivods (this is one of the eldest office in Poland; its origins dates back to the X century and its name means in free translation into English: “a men who lead knights”) are held responsible for carrying out state policies in his voivodship. As a representative of the Cabinet, a voivod may also give out directives binding for all bodies of state administration and, during emergency situations also for local administration bodies. The voivod, as the direct head of the integrated state administration in voivodship (such as Police, Fire-departments), directs and coordinates its operation, guarantees conditions favorable for its efficiency and is held responsible for its results. He is also aptly authorized regarding state non-integrated administration (subordinate directly to responsible central minister or head of a central office – for example Voivodship Health and Epidemiology Service) - files applications for the appointment or the demotion of bodies of the said administration to an appropriate civil administration minister. The voivod represents the State Treasury regarding assets granted to him for the objective of executing his tasks. Based on the terms and covenants of appropriate legislative regulations, the voivod supervises the operation of local administration units. The Prime Minister appoints and recalls the voivod

¹ This part of Report was prepared mostly on the basis of information obtained from Silesian Voivodship Office and Wielkopolska Voivodship Marshal Office.

based on a request of proper civil administration minister, and supervises the conformance of voivod's activities with state government policy. The appropriate civil administration minister supervises overall work performance of the voivod for conformance with the law as well as diligence and quality management.

The Voivodeship's self-government, represented by local government assembly and an executive body - the voivodship Council headed by the voivodship marshal as its presiding officer, determines the Voivodeship's development strategy and executes its development policy which comprises: forming the conditions for economic development, including creating the labour market; maintaining and extending the social and technical infrastructure of the Voivodeship significance; acquiring and combining the public and private financial resources in order to execute the tasks in the scope of the public usability; supporting and running the activities to increase the educational level of citizens; rational usage of the natural resources and forming the natural environment with the principle of the balanced development; supporting the development of science and co-operation between the sphere of science and economy; promoting the technological progress and the protection and rational usage of the cultural heritage; promoting the Voivodeship's development prospects and opportunities.

The Voivodeship self-government executes the tasks of the Voivodeship nature, determined by laws and particularly in the following scope: public education, including the schools of higher education; health promotion and protection; culture and protection of its values, social welfare; modernising the rural areas; land development; environment protection; public roads and collective transport; physical culture and tourism; counteracting the unemployment and activating the local labour market. Voivoship local administration is regulated by Legislative Act from the June 5, 1998;

2) *Powiat* – unit of territorial organisation smaller than voivodship but bigger than basic units, which is known as *gmina*. Can be compared to counties. Each powiat comprises of several *gmins*. In 1998 in Poland was set up 373 powiats. There are two types of powiats: the basic territorial division unit that comprises the entire areas of the bordering boroughs – a land powiat or the whole town area – a town with the rights of a powiat. A powiat executes the public tasks of cross-borough nature. It serves the inhabitants in quite a general scope, among others, it maintains and manages schools, libraries and social clubs, supervises the road constructions and repairs as well as manages the social welfare and fights the unemployment. At this level local administration is exercised by the Powiat Council and the


powiat Board led by the *starost* (chief powiat official). Powiat's local administration is regulated by Legislative Act from the June 5, 1998;

3) Gmina (borough, municipality) – basic, local unit of territorial division and self – government. The scope of its activity comprises the public affairs of the local significance, unreserved statutorily for other entities. Predominantly, gmina is responsible for satisfying the primary, concrete needs of its inhabitants; it deals with planning and managing the lands, environment protection, roads, bridges, streets, public transport, supplying the inhabitants with electricity and heating; keeping the surroundings tidy as well as managing and maintaining the borough buildings and the public usage facilities. Self government at this level was created shortly after the collapse of communist regime, pursuant to the Legislative Act from 8 March 1990. It was established 2,483 gmin. Their size oscillated mostly between 5000 – 9999 inhabitants (in this partition was included in 1996 almost 43,4%, that is 1078 gmins). Local administration in gmina is executed through legislative and supervisory organ – gmina's Council and executive body – mayor of rural gminas (*wójt*), mayor of urban gminas (*burmistrz*) and mayor of major cities (above 100.000 inhabitants – *prezydent*). The gmina, powiat and voivodship councilmen as well as mayors of rural gminas, mayors of urban gminas and mayors of major cities are elected in general, equal, direct election by a secret ballot for four year cadency.

Local government budgets include their own income as well as general and specifically directed subsidies from the national budget. The units of local government are authorized to set taxes and local charges based on legislative legal regulations. The independence of the local administration is subject to court protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The function of local governments is supervised by central administration - Prime Minister and voivods and regional Audit Chambers.

It is worth to underline that territorial division of the country and the structure of public authorities established in 1998 meet the solutions accepted in European countries with a comparative population and size. These facilitates in undertaking an international working relationship at local and regional levels as well as allow to more fully use legal and economic tools devised by the European Union.

Organisation of state and self-government administration in Poland



Source: Marshal Office of Wielkopolska Voivodship

Information about Silesia Voivodship

University of Silesia, one of cooperating European research institutions in the framework of the project “CAT” lies in the Silesia Voivodship. It will be better to understand potential threat of terrorist attacks when we instruct with some statistic data about this region. The unique economic position of the Silesia Voivodship results from the fact that it is the most industrialised and urbanised region in Poland. The high urbanisation rate is evidenced by the value of almost 79% of the population inhabiting the region’s 71 towns of which: 4 towns have the population over 200 thousand inhabitants, 8 towns have the population from 100 to 200 thousand inhabitants, 11 have the population from 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants.

The Silesian Voivodeship holds 14th position in Poland in terms of the area occupied and 2nd in terms of the population number. Within this relatively small area, covering 12,331 km², i.e. 3,9% of Poland’s territory, there are 4,714,982 inhabitants, i.e. 12,3% of the general

population number, which is the highest population density in Poland (382 people/km² versus average 122 people/km² in Poland and 116 people/km² in the EU). Such a large population concentrates in the relatively small area forms the huge potential sales market of consumable goods, as well as terrorist outrages. It is the Upper-Silesian Agglomeration that makes the region specific. It is the complex of towns, in fact adjacent to one another, spanning for 70 km from Dabrowa Górnicza to Gliwice. It covers about 18% of the Voivodeship's area (1,200 sq. km.) and it is inhabited by almost 60% of the region's population, i.e. 2,8 million people. The average population density is over 1,900 people/sq. km. and is almost 5 times higher than the regional rate.

ANALISYS OF THE MAIN TOPICS:
Panel I – Prevention of terrorism and community relations

Designing out terrorism

One of the perspective area of antiterrorism prevention, common in large Western European cities and almost absent in Central and Eastern part of our continent, is specially designed architecture. This topic was discussed by **Mr. Guy Collyer**. He started from the origins of the concept of using the environment to protect vital assets. It is not a new idea, because humans have adapted the environment around them to help protect them, since the days of the Pyramids in Egypt and castles surrounded by water. Similarly, we can use environment to protect our communities from terrorist threats. Designing out terrorism should be based on previous experiences flowing from terrorist attacks. By analysing what has occurred in the past, local communities can learn the lessons and design a safer future.

Environmental antiterrorist protection creates a complex problem for local authorities. Municipalities have to invest in specially constructed buildings, design “open spaces” in cities and use materials which can protect from the effects of terrorist acts. The main means for protection/reduction of effects of terrorist attacks which can be used in architectural designing are:

- using different types of laminated glasses;
- using preventive measures to keep vehicles in safe distant from buildings;
- using concrete, not metal barriers;
- using different kind of blockades (trees, metal barriers, statues etc.);
- creates closed, small streets.

These different measures must be used complementarily to tackle the problems presented by small groups of people determined to commit atrocious acts of terrorism, with no regard for their own safety. It is especially important in the context of suicide attacks². Another problem is connected with high cost of redesigning cities. However, for example in UK, there is no problem with funding, since we are talking about public places. The situation is much more complicated in relation to the private shopping centers, despite of the fact, that there is awareness of the shopping mall owners and they are easy to be convinced about

² They can be committed also by women, as proved i.e. the arrest of at least two women out of 24 suspects initially held in the foiled plot in London. Outside Europe are lots of proofs of women engagements in terrorists activities, e. i. an Iraqi woman, Sajida al-Rishawi, appeared on Jordanian television in November 2005 confessing her intent to bomb a Western hotel in the capital city of Amman together with her husband. Having failed to release her explosives belt, her husband pushed her out of the ballroom and detonated his explosives. See: F. Ali: *London plot draws attention to potential female suicide bombers* [in:] *Terrorism Focus*, Volume III, Issue 33, August 22, 2006, p. 2.

necessary investments. The costs should not be also overestimated, in this context it cannot be omitted that some of the elements of the small city architecture are really cheap. Money needed for environmental protection can be gained by the municipalities from additional taxes. It is not a popular idea among the members of local community, but, in the opinion of supporters of antiterrorist architecture, security is always expensive and in our interest lies to protect earlier our cities. Environmental design is important because of the longevity of the threat and the design life of buildings.

Conception of environmental antiterrorist protection is also strongly criticised. Some of the critics underline that the costs of safeguarding of buildings are significant and only selected objects can be protected. For example: there was a simulation of bomb blast as an effect of terrorist attack in Warsaw. Results of this event would have place three km from the place of detonation. Even if some buildings would be protected from effects of detonation, still it is impossible to protect them all. And terrorists do not choose specific aims, they strike at random.

There is no one typical system of architectural designing which can be treated as a model for the rest of Europe. However, UK has rich experiences in this area. Officials in this country have a duty of care, to ensure that people work in the safest environment possible. To achieve this, British National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and its network of Counter Terrorism Security Advisers deliver protective security advice within the UK. This is focused on protection materials that could be weaponised by terrorists, and delivering security advice to those places that could be targeted or considered vulnerable by terrorists. When delivering such advice to local authorities officials from NaCTSO should ensure that the advice is practical, achievable, affordable, reasonable and sustainable.

Important for local authorities is to involved in the development of architectural protection at the earliest possible, conceptual stage of the project. Once plans have been drawn, it is often too late to ask for the inclusion of more robust security measures or changes to the overall design, to allow for counter terrorism techniques such as stand off distances. As well as protecting high profile buildings, it is important to consider the surrounding area.

Additionally, when examining environmental features it is also important for local security managers to remember that terrorists will make planning visits to a target. They have been known to look for vulnerabilities so that they may exploit them. Evidence has shown that they will video targets and discuss options and timings.

Local Authorities experience at prevention of terrorism

Mr. Spencer Webster, Head of Risk and Emergency Planning from Halton Borough Council (UK) delivered presentation devoted to British local authorities experiences at prevention of terrorism. Great Britain is a valuable partner to share experiences with, because British communities faced the threat of Irish Republican terrorism for more than three decades. Nowadays, municipalities in UK stand in the first European line as the potential new 'International' terrorism aim, as was proved in London (7/7/2005).

Mr. Webster discussed wide range of different issues, but especially concentrated on the following topics:

1. Brief on local government structure in England;
2. Local Government relationship with Central Government;
3. Brief on the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Act);
4. Impact of the Act on emergency services and local authorities;
5. Local authority implementation of the Act;
6. Terrorism – local authority emergency preparedness;
7. Emergency Planning / Community Safety (“Opportunities for Improved partnership”);
8. Local Government White Paper proposals (“Strong and prosperous communities”).

Firstly, Mr. Webster covered the issue of structure of local government in Britain. According to the speaker it was necessary, to “set the scene” before attempting to look at local authority’s response. This means that Mr. Webster gave an overview to the above mention areas, which have a bearing on how and when local authorities respond.

The structure of local government in the UK is a somewhat complicated. There is a two-tier structure and a single tier. The two tier structure consists of county councils who provide, among other services, education, social services, emergency planning for the county areas, and district councils who provide a range of very localised services such as waste management, community safety, planning, and emergency planning. The single tier structure consists of unitary councils, metropolitan councils and city councils. These councils have complete control over their service delivery. Funding for providing all council services is derived from central government grants and local council taxes/service charges.

In addition to determining what services are required to be provided locally, councils are very much driven by central government initiatives either through guidance or legislation.

Examples of legislation and guidance can be seen in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Department of Health guidance on Pandemic Flu arrangements, Home Office and their influence in the Community Safety Agenda, and the Cabinet Office, especially the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This latter department, very influential for emergency planning all over the country, was established to enhance the UK's ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from, emergencies. It is strongly involved in Integrated Emergency Management, (IEM), which has been in use in the UK for many years. This concept allows for a multi agency approach to emergency planning which anticipates, assesses, prevents, prepares, responds, and recovers from all type of incidents. It's an all hazards approach. This concept is especially useful in the case of terrorism threats, which requires a multi-level answer. It represented a major "sea change" in the way emergency planning (Civil Protection) was organised the UK. However, there is still a problem with sharing of information about terrorism threats and emergency planning. There is no legislation, which would oblige different governmental and local agencies to work closely and share information. Communication, the crucial conditions of effective communities emergency – planning policy in Britain is sometimes provided through contacts between people who work for the emergency planning units. Similar problem of lack of institutional and technical system of communications appeared also in Poland.

In UK the most important legislative document in the area of communities emergency planning is Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It was designed to deliver a single framework for civil protection in the UK to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Prior to the introduction of the Act, emergency planning was not viewed by some agencies as a necessary service on which to commit resources, time, and energy. When incident occurred agencies coped very well, on the whole. Little attention was paid to recovery issues, it was more a reactive focus for many. The Act has led to a strengthening of the emergency planning function in all agencies especially now that it is a statutory duty, and the threat of terrorism, and attack have become part of life in the UK. To achieve the objective of the Act, agencies were divided in to two groups, Category 1 responders and Category Two responder. Category 1 responders are Local Authorities, Police, Fire, Ambulance, Health Agencies, Environment Agency and Maritime and Coastguard. Category 2 responders are Utility Companies, Airports, Train Operators, Network Rail, Harbours and Ports, Highways Agency, Health and Safety Executive. Act contains few solutions which can be adopted by communities in different than UK, European countries. Especially, it is worth to mention:

a) On the basis of Civil Contingencies Act 2004, lots of British communities created Local Resilience Forums (LFRs), which based on Police Force Boundaries, Community Risk Register and Regional Resilience Forums (RRFs). In consequence many emergency planning task groups have been formed under the umbrella of the local resilience forums. In addition to focussing on local resilience there has been a steady influence of government guidance documents, which have been issued, via the Regional Resilience Forums. These guidance documents have included planning for different incidents, temporary mortuary provision, mass fatalities, and mass evacuation. As a result many existing plans have been reviewed and new plan produced. Training, exercising, testing regimes have been strengthened. When incidents have occurred there has been an improved multi agency response due to the availability of robust plans, knowledge and expertise in roles and responsibilities. Such system ensure greater co-ordination, identification of risks, identified gaps in preparedness, training and exercising, as well as ensure consistency of activity across tiers of Government. For this reasons solutions contained in the Act should be duplicated, with preserving necessary local dissimilarities in the other European countries;

b) Act emphasis the need that all category of its responders, businesses and voluntary sector agencies should have in place business continuity plans to minimise the effects of a terrorism incidents. Increased local authority partnerships will bring many challenges in this area. In institutional dimension this initiative was expressed in Business Continuity Management (BCM), which is responsible for preparation of emergency plans, as well as advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary sector;

c) Act identifies prevention rather than respond as a key of any antiterrorist policy at local level. That is why it is a strong need to establish close relations, through advice, warning, keeping informed, plan and test communications, with public. It is essence of antiterrorism policy, not only at local level. The success of community policing should have been based on the relationships built between law enforcement and community members. These relationships, is often expressed as “*collaborative partnerships*”. Citizens should have possessed a voice in the public safety of their community. Community policing should have encouraged community members to partner with law enforcement to identify potential threats and create a climate of safety. The community policing philosophy is well positioned to take a major role in preventing and responding to terrorism and in efforts to reduce citizen fear. Instead of de-emphasizing community policing efforts, Police departments should realise that community policing may be more important than ever in dealing with terrorism in their

communities³. In fact, effective antiterrorist prevention needs decentralisation of the system of management and strengthening position of local officers. According to the accurate opinion of Scheider and Chapman local law enforcement officers are likely to come into contact with those who may be directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities and most certainly will be among the first responders to any future terrorist attack. Empowering officers at lower levels with decision-making authority and familiarizing them with making (and taking responsibility for) important decisions could be of value in any crisis. In a terrorist event, there may be little time for decisions to move up the chain of command. Officers who are accustomed to making decisions and retaining authority may be better prepared to respond quickly and decisively to any event. In addition, in terms of prevention, developing a flat organizational structure can help lower-level officers feel free to pursue leads or suspected terrorist activity. In addition, having fixed geographic responsibility may assist officers in identifying possible terrorist threats. Officers who work in a community or neighborhood for an extended time can develop specific intelligence concerning resident and community activities. This street-level knowledge is a vital part of counter-intelligence efforts⁴.

Communications with the public includes also: joint initiatives, reassuring messages, warning messages, sharing information during terrorism incidents, and, very important, use of community leaders (whose can be sometimes also religious leaders). In UK communities widely use the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships which based on partnership statements between local authorities and local leaders.

British government understands the necessity of strengthen local communities in the face of terrorist threats. That is why Department for Communities and Local Governments published in 2006 white paper entitled: “*Strong and Prosperous Communities*”. This document, open for consultation, indicates that local authorities should produce a Community Strategy, operate Strategic Partnerships, and have in place Local Area Agreements. Community involvement, partnership and leadership are key to the document. The white paper also seeks to realign services provided by agencies on such issues as community safety, health and community cohesion. It provides an opportunity to empower communities, and in so doing provides further opportunities for community safety and emergency planning to work together not just in preventing terrorism, but improving the response and recovery plans for when it happens.

³ M.C. Scheider, R. Chapman: *Community policing and terrorism*, April 2003, See: <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Scherider-Chapman.html>

⁴ Ibidem. See also: A.S. Dietz: *Evaluating community policing: quality police service and fear of crime* [in:] *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*, vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 83–100.

Problem of prevention of terrorism in the context of multiethnic diversification of the societies

During seminar discussion participants often asked questions directed to clarify previously delivered presentation. Accidentally, issue of antiterrorist prevention in the context of assimilation of immigrants was also debated. Most of modern European societies based on multiculturalism. Despite of evident positive points, multiculturalism sometimes generates new tensions between different ethnics, national and religious groups. This is a very serious threat for the stability of local communities. Additionally, it is strengthened by such phenomenon's, which occurred in our cities as: mass unemployment, poverty, high level of immigration. Immigrants and their children, often poor – educated, with no language skills and without Western cultural background frequently feel socially marginalised. This is the reason why they are susceptible to terrorists propaganda and some of them is eager to engaged in terrorism activities (this is also interesting example of how international terrorism in connection with local conditions can affected relations between communities). It is crucial for local authorities to provide actions directed to integrate or assimilate of immigrants. In long term perspective such actions will pay through lower the grade of local terrorist threat⁵. It should be based on three political strategies⁶:

a) supporting immigrants in a process of adaptation to the community and local culture: integration policies being understood as a process of cultural integration;

b) improving of cohesion of the community and intercommunity contacts: integration as improvement in living together in respect and tolerance;

c) support by local governments: setting up mediation service and antidiscriminatory programmes.

For local authorities would be especially useful to elaborate, through cooperation and sharing experiences, common European culture of urban crime prevention in its antiterrorism dimension⁷. Such culture should be as flexible as possible to include different approaches to crime prevention in European municipalities, determined by local conditions.

⁵ See also: House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee: *Terrorism and community relations. Sixth report of session 2004 – 2005, Volume I*, London April 2005.

⁶ See: S. Engel, D. Lodwick, Z. Khattabi: *Immigration and prevention: a training manual for local actors*, European Forum for Urban Safety, Paris 2006, p. 16.

⁷ See also: J. Kulach, N. Whiskin, E. Marks: *Cultures of prevention. Urban crime prevention policies in Europe: towards a common culture?*, European Forum for Urban Safety, Paris, 2006.

However, antiterrorist prevention in the context of community relations, primary objective of most Western European authorities, lies outside the scope of interest of Polish local authorities. It is caused by the fact of monoethnic composition of Polish society. Despite of above mention fact, this issue was considered during the seminar discussion.

Border between security needs and human rights – local dimension

One of the most important question, vital not only for states, but also for local communities is: where is a border between justified security needs and civil liberties? Especially how we can avoid prejudice and intercultural hatred or violence in case of terrorist attack? Nowadays we are witnesses of passing different legislative acts which limit civil liberties and human right under motivation of efficient fight with terrorism. British Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 is a good example of such practice. This act allows for arresting, without formal judicial decisions, only on the basis of administrative decision of responsible minister, people suspecting for terrorist activity. This is a well - known example from top national shelf. But maybe more dangerous, because unproportionally frequent are acts of discrimination conducted at local level. They touch common people, sometimes our neighbors. They are also dangerous for their initiators, because concept of collective responsibility can paradoxically rise to the radicalisation of behaviors among discriminated minority and gives terrorists new supporters. This is a paradox of vicious circle: discriminatory acts designed to protect majority become an impulse for fight against them. Therefore, condition *sine qua non* to obtain successful results in the fight against terrorism is maintaining necessary balance between limitation of civil liberties and real terrorist threat. Communities should established close, based on confidence, relations between local authorities and citizens. They should avoid to discriminate immigrants, because any expression of discriminatory behavior become additional argument for terrorists⁸.


As a metaphorical memento we can cited the words of Winston Churchill, who noticed that executive power to keep people to prison without formulating against them formal accusation in connection with an offence prescribing by law is in the highest grade disgusting and become a foundation of any totalitarian government, without difference nazist or communist.

⁸ See also: A. Blick, T. Choudhury and S. Weir: *The Rules of the game: terrorism, community and human rights. A report by Democratic Audit, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, For the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust.*

Panel II – Emergency response

The Role of Police in the case of crisis situation in the context of terrorist attack

Inspector Jacek Bartoszek from the Antiterrorist Branch, Central Investigation Bureau, Headquarters of Polish Police dealt with the issue of police emergency response in the event of terrorist attack. Speaker started his presentation from the conclusion that Polish police luckily has only theoretical experiences with the answer the terrorist events. As it is showed below, in Poland up to date, there was no significant terrorist outrages.



*Death and injured persons in Poland caused by bomb blasts in the years 1993 – 2002
Blue color – death persons, green color – injured persons.*

However, because of its foreign police, Poland constitutes a potential aim for radical Islamic, terrorist group. Polish local authorities, especially in larger cities, as well as police forces, should be prepared for attack. Police as a sophisticated government institution must be ready to serve, protect and deal with all kind of illegal attacks against people and their goods. To achieve these goals there is a need to divide the Police work into two separate stages.

Stage one of Police work covers permanent recognition of potential threats and preventive activity. As it was notice before the era of 11 September, but it is still actual “*The community policing approach to law enforcement seeks (nowadays – JB) to address the causes of crime and reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving strategies and police community partnerships. A fundamental shift from traditional reactive*

*policing, community policing strives to prevent crime before it occurs*⁹. However, “*The Police must always have the capacity to respond immediately to a crisis, but a holistic community criminal justice approach would recognize the contribution of both prevention and intervention*”¹⁰. One of the most important Police activity includes work with local communities. According to the Bucqueroux, the overarching goal should be for the police to become partners with the community, empowering them so that they can shoulder their share of the responsibility and the tough work of making their neighborhoods safer. One of the most potent means of involving the community in exploring creative ways to enhance public safety is to provide them a *Community Policing Officer*, who acts as a problem solver and as an ombudsman to other public and private agencies that can help. *Community Policing Officers* act as the family physicians, who have the time, opportunity, and continuity to not only treat illness but to prevent disease and promote good health¹¹. This optimistic foundation is frequently confronted with the reality. For example in UK is a continuing evidence from a number of sources that a significant gap remains between police and minority ethnic perceptions of police work¹². We can change this situation by appointing minority ethnic police officers and changing the place of initial training for police officers from district training centers back into the community, so new police officers learn policing skills within the communities which they will police¹³. Law enforcement leaders must also ensure that the local police role is clearly defined and communicated within the agency and to the community¹⁴.

Police in most cases collect intelligence data in order to find out the phenomenon of terrorism itself as well as to prevent concrete terrorist acts. To identify and prioritize local problems the police and community need to share information. Citizens should also have some access to local crime information. In the context of prevention buildings which have strategic values and might be a target for terrorists are constantly monitored and secured. That stage is accomplished by criminal and preventive Police forces. The most important role in

⁹ M.J. Hickman and B.A. Reaves: *Community Policing in Local Police Departments, 1997 and 1999* [in:] U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, *Special Report*, February 2001, p. 1.

¹⁰ B. Bucqueroux: *What community policing teaches us about community criminal justice* [in:] *Policing.com* 517-381-9884, p. 2.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Terrorism and Community Relations, The Government reply to the Sixth Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2004-05 HC 165, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, June 2005 Cm 6593 £4.00*, p. 3.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Protecting your community from terrorism: strategies for local law enforcement, Volume 2: working with diverse communities*, Community Oriented Policy Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington March 2004, p. 52.

counterterrorism was given in Poland to Central Bureau of Investigation which is responsible for coordinating and cooperating with all kind of Police formations and with Interior Security Agency, Border Guards and Military Police.

Stage two of Police work covers actions taken right after the attack. Police experts are used in case where there is a need of calling a crisis management in order to minimize the consequences of the attack and to protect the civilians. Crisis response is divided into four phases: to stop the development of the crisis situation, health aid for victims and limiting the losses of goods. Documents which regulate the role of the Polish Police work in such situations is Act on the Police and Regulation no 1429 of Commander in Chief of the Polish Police regarding the crisis situation.

Police is one of the element used during the crisis situation. The way of Police actions depends on the type of the terrorist attack. Sometimes Police is used as a leading element sometimes as a supporting element or cooperating element. The example of the Police supporting role would be the situation that took place in Katowice after the tragedy during the International Fairs of Racing Pigeons "GOŁĄB 2006" in January 2006 r. where the building had collapsed. The size of this catastrophe could be compared to the terrorist attacks which took place in London or Madrid. The most important target in case of such catastrophes is to serve and help victims of the attacks. Other institutions must cooperate together with the

Police tasks in the event of terrorist attack could be introduced in four points.

1. Public Order Activity

- to make easy access for the ER to get to the victims,
- to organize detours and spread information about them,
- to secure the crime scenes so the rescue teams could work,
- to prevent form crowd formations and panic around the scene,
- to pilot transport from and to the place of crime,
- to inform injured and victims about evacuation as well as helping in organizing the community information points,
- protection of the left property,
- identification of the dead.

2. Warnings and Alerts

- to obtain and distribute information about the attacks to other services working on the case,
- to distribute information for the community through media,
- to make available Police communication systems in order to coordinate and

cooperate with other government institutions and rescue teams (however operated only by Police officers)

3. Direct Rescue Activity

- to help evacuating the victims from the endangered areas using Police transportation equipment,
- first aid to those who need it immediately,
- to make available Police buildings for supervision purposes.

4. The return to the situation before the attack

- to traffic regulations,
- to protection of the aid centers,
- to give out information about the place of stay of victims and about their property as well as about the current threat situation.

Preparation of the fire-department units to the rescue actions in the event of terrorist attacks

This part of seminar was covered by the **Brigadier Janusz Skulich**, Chief of Provincial Fire-Department. During presentation were discussed following issues:

1. Consequences of terrorist acts;
2. Division of tasks between fire-departments internal units in the context of terrorist acts;
3. Establishment and development of national fire-protection network;
4. Preparing procedures of conducting rescue actions;
5. Preparing procedures of cooperation with other responsible rescue services;
6. Place of rescue system in the crisis management structure;
7. Preparation of rescue skills through exercises;
8. Rescue equipment.

In the event of terrorist attack the first responders are the local fire service, law enforcement and emergency medical technicians. As response efforts escalate, the local emergency management agency and health department will help coordinate needed services. Primary duties of local departments, such as fire, law enforcement, along with those of the local emergency management agency and health department should be carefully addressed in their respective emergency operation plan.

Local authorities in the face of bioterrorist attack. Methods of preparations and reactions

Dr Anna Szczerba – Sachs, Deputy Director of the Provincial Health and Epidemiology Service discussed the new and dangerous type of terrorism that is bioterrorism. Biological terrorism can be defined as an intentional release of viruses, bacteria, or their toxins for the purpose of harming or killing people. In addition to aerosolization, food, water, or insects must be considered as potential vehicles of transmission for biological weapons. Public health officials must be prepared to address varied biological agents, including pathogens. Biological weapon is especially attractive for the terrorists, because it is:

1. relatively cheap in comparison with damages it can make;
2. easy to obtain;
3. hard to detect;
4. effect of its use appears usually after some time, so perpetrators have enough time for escape;
5. It causes social consequences – panic, fear among population.

We can distinguish three categories of biological threats: A, B, and C¹⁵. The highest-priority agents, Category A Agents¹⁶, include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they¹⁷:

- Can be easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person;
- Cause high mortality and subsequently have a major public health impact;
- Might cause public panic and social disruption; and;
- Require special action for public health preparedness.

A subset of Category B agents includes pathogens that are foodborne or waterborne. Category B agents include those that¹⁸:

¹⁵ See also: *The Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Terrorism. Interim Planning Guidance For State Public Health Officials*, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention July 2001; See also: *Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: a template for Healthcare Facilities*. Document prepared by APIC Bioterrorism Task Force (Judith F. English, Mae Y. Cundiff, John D. Malone, and Jeanne A. Pfeiffer), CDC Hospital Infections Program Bioterrorism Working Group (Michael Bell, Lynn Steele, and J. Michael Miller), 4/13/99.

¹⁶ Agent means living organisms or the materials derived from them that cause disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants or cause deterioration of material. Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders.

¹⁷ Category A Agents: *Variola major* (smallpox), *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax), *Yersinia pestis* (plague), *Clostridium botulinum* toxin (botulism), *Francisella tularensis* (tularemia), Hemorrhagic fever (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, Lassa viruses).

¹⁸ Category B Agents: *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever), *Brucella* species (brucellosis), *Burkholderia mallei* (glanders), Alphaviruses, Venezuelan encephalomyelitis, eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis, Ricin toxin from *Ricinus communis* (castor beans), Epsilon toxin of *Clostridium perfringens*, *Staphylococcus enterotoxin B*, *Salmonella* species, *Shigella dysenteriae*, *Escherichia coli* O157:H7, *Vibrio cholerae*, *Cryptosporidium parvum*.

- Are moderately easy to disseminate;
- Cause moderate morbidity and low mortality; and
- Require specific enhancements public health preparedness, diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance.

Category C agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of their¹⁹:

- Availability;
- Ease of production and dissemination; and
- Potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact.

Preparedness for Category C agents requires ongoing research to improve disease detection, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. Knowing in advance which newly emergent pathogens terrorists might employ is not possible; therefore, it is imperative to link bioterrorism preparedness efforts with ongoing disease surveillance and outbreak response activities.

The two broad goals of surveillance related to bioterrorism preparedness and response are early detection of an event and enhanced disease tracking in the population during an emergency response. Surveillance data must be linked to the appropriate authorities who will investigate unusual instances of health service utilization and unusual clusters of illness or deaths. Surveillance planning should detail how surveillance information will be investigated and how this information will be linked to other emergency response officials at the community and state levels.

After an event, a proper emergency response to an epidemic will require enhanced surveillance activity to manage the outbreak and to monitor progress. Planning may involve contingencies for augmenting existing surveillance activities and the surveillance workforce, active reporting, and enhanced information management capacity²⁰.

Responding to a bioterrorism incident or large-scale infectious disease outbreak may require the use of a variety of emergency public health measures. These may include quarantine, isolation, closing public places, seizing property, mandatory vaccination, travel restrictions, and disposal of the dead. Because the most critical public health responses probably will be those taken immediately at the state and local levels, health officials and their lawyers should review the statutes, regulations, and ordinances that authorize these

¹⁹ Category C Agents: Nipah virus, Hantaviruses, Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses, Tickborne encephalitis viruses, Yellow fever virus, Multidrug-resistant *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*.

²⁰ *The Public...*, s. 46.

emergency public health measures and develop legally sound procedures for executing them²¹.

Prior to recognition and during a recognized disease outbreak caused by an act of biological terrorism, workers may have contact with patients who are infected by the biological agent. Most agents of bioterrorism are not transmitted from person-to-person, however, for agents such as smallpox or pneumonic plague, a worker is at risk of acquiring infection from the patient. Workers potentially at risk due to occupational exposure include:

- traditional first responders (police, fire, and EMS) who transport ill patients to medical facilities;
- health care workers who care for patients in hospitals, residential facilities, out-patient settings, at home, or elsewhere;
- laboratory personnel handling clinical specimens; and
- health department staffs who visit patients in or out of health care facilities while conducting outbreak assessment or control measures²².

Dr Anna Szczerba – Sachs discussed also organisation and tasks of Polish Health and Epidemiology Service.

Energetic security in the era of terrorist threat. State and local dimension

Second day of the seminar (14th Nov.) began from the presentation of **Prof. Krzysztof Kubiak** from Polish Naval College. Speaker turn attention into the fact of changing nature of terrorist threat. Nowadays, it is not just the tool to achieve particular political aims, but the tactics to realize long terming, ideological purposes. Thus, it is reasonable to state that current fundamental terrorism will develop as a massive phenomenon. The future offenders, especially those coming from religious organizations, will probably focus their efforts on attacking major strategic objects, like social infrastructure, for example: energetic installations. Damage of those objects - essential for our society - will increase the atmosphere of danger and chaos. Gaining of such situation can be treated as the main terrorists aim. Probability of that screenplay should be the matter of urgent and careful attention in every western country, also in Poland. To prevent, we should consider that our energetic safety depends on how we will organize the system of delivery basic sources.

²¹ Ibidem, s. 49.

²² Ibidem, s. 50.

In Polish conditions, only little percent of local societies is potentially able to build their own energetic systems. Although based on natural features like wind or geothermal sources, power plants could diversify the national energetic (power) system, what is overall reason to support local governments to build them. Poland's government has made the decision to built LNG (*Liquified Natural Gas*) port. To support, it is worth to realize that it is simply cheaper to built system of terminals than a pipeline. Moreover, possession the specialized reloading base gives greater flexibility to choose our deliverers.

On the other hand: the crude oil and LNG tankers can be the objects of attack aimed for destroying the ships and targets for hijacking. The real battle experiences (mainly from so called Tanker War 1986-1988 in Persian Gulf) show that destroying the great tanker (especially crude oil tanker) is a very difficult task. Moreover also the attack for *Limburg* proved quite a high hardness of even partly loaded tanker. It indicates that the hijacking of the ship can be the best way of using it as the “*weapon*”. Capturing the ship makes an accurate preparing the vessel for destroying possible or gives the perpetrators an opportunity of turning the tanker to the rocky – for example – coast. One of the greatest concerns should be the usage of fully – loaded tankers against coastal cities.

It is obvious, that the terrorist organization, which is able to destroy or capture a loaded tanker, gains an effective tool to make a real “*Armageddon*” or very effective argument to blackmail the government, which is the action against. We could even risk a thesis, that due to potential economic and social effects of ecological disaster the perpetrators can achieve stronger position then the government. Political after-effects of ecological disaster caused by terrorists can be even more considerable then economic ones. The catastrophe can complicate situation of the government if its decisions (or lack of them) persuaded the terrorists to execute the destruction of a hijacked ship. On the internal level most of the people who live in contaminated area probably will express theirs discontent during the next election. Hijacking a loaded tanker gives also the terrorist organization, beside a very effective tool of blackmail, also considerable propaganda benefits. Such action would have been obviously publicized by the media. The threat of causing an ecological disaster can also wake up a sense of common threat, psychosis of fear, and disbelief in the government’s effectiveness.

To sum up, above all costs and dangers sea transport is the only alternative to prevent Poland and its business as well as citizens from lack of energy caused by terrorist attack. This conception is also considered in whole European Union as the most realistic one. Of course

building terminals is not enough to safe us in the case of an attack but well planned diversification will give us more opportunities to react immediately.

Panel III - Crisis management and communication systems

Crisis management and communication in the event of terrorist attack

Commissioner Grzegorz Kamienowski, Director of the Silesian Crisis Management Center discussed important issue of crisis management and communication in the event of terrorist attack. Crisis management can be defined as a law enforcement aspect of an incident that involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat of terrorism²³. The efficient system of crisis management should be based on following principles:

1. priority of territorialisation
2. one – person leadership and responsibility;
3. principle of adequacy and commonness;
4. formal division between systems of civil preparedness²⁴ and military preparedness with providing compatibility and cooperation between these two systems.

In Poland chief of Provincional governmental administration (*wojewoda*) fulfils its task connected with crisis management through two kind of documents: *Operational Provincional Plan* which includes defense planning and defense programming, and *Crisis Response Plan* which precises various measures, which can be taken in the event of crisis situation, especially:

1. tasks connected with the threats monitoring;
2. rescue resources and technical measures;
3. procedures used in the time of crisis situation.

²³ See: *Guide for all-hazard emergency operations planning. State And Local Guide (101), Chapter 6 Attachment G – Terrorism, Federal Emergency Management Agency, April 2001, p. 6-G-F-1.*

²⁴ Preparedness means establishing the plans, training, exercises, and resources necessary to achieve readiness for all hazards, including Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents.

Panel IV - Solidarity and public support

Eastern European experiences with the support of terrorism victims: political and cultural aspects

Mrs. Lina Kolesnikova, Consultant from Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe in interesting presentation summed up Eastern European experiences with the support of terrorist victims. As a starting point, Mrs. Kolesnikova noticed that each year on 11th of March, the European Union dedicates a Memorial Day expressing its solidarity to all victims of Terrorism. 11th of March 2006 has marked the second anniversary of the Madrid attacks, the most deadly terrorist assault in Europe, and the second "European day for the victims of terrorism". It is a day of remembrance, an occasion to express solidarity with the victims of any terrorist attack: those who lost their lives or still bear the mental and physical scars of such violence, and with their families.

Crisis and disaster management identifies several categories of victims. Victims of terrorist attacks can be classified by the degree of presence at and degree of direct impact by the terrorist attack. Therefore, there are **primary** (direct), **secondary** and **tertiary** (indirect) victims. Also important here is the time dimension. Those primary victims are present at the scene during onset of the attack. Secondary are typically present at the scene after the attack, though, not all of them. Tertiary victims are typically not present at the scene at all.

Primary (Direct) victims are those physically present at, or in close proximity to, an event. This includes those who died and those who survived the attack, as well as immediate witnesses of the attack who happened to be at or next to the scene. Number of people in this category is typically limited, though, might be still very significant.

Secondary victims include the family members and close associates of primary (direct) victims. Disasters, involving violent criminal mass victimisation, result in intensified psychological reactions among not only direct victims and families, but relief workers as well – thus making the relief effort more challenging and stressful. Therefore, secondary victims' category includes also first responders (Special Forces, police, fire-fighters, military, rescue personnel) and other professionals who assist direct victims (medical personnel, psychologists, clergy, NGOs like Red Cross, etc.). Typically, number of people in this category is higher than number of primary direct victims.

Tertiary (Indirect) victims are those individuals in a community who are impacted by the secondary effects of disaster. Number of people in this category is the highest. Reached largely through the media, they are the audience for the terror and recognise little distinction

between themselves and direct victims. Visualisation of flow and consequences of terrorist attack by media makes those individuals feel like a victim and, potentially, transpose the same fear, anger and psychological traumas to those otherwise not directly affected by the attack. Due to the quality and the repetitiveness of visualisation, some tertiary victims may suffer like primary and secondary victims, and, therefore, should be a subject to the appropriate assistance. These indirect victims are the principal targets of terrorism. This large part of population subjected to fear, anger and other emotions that may influence the social transformations in a way desired by terrorists.

Additionally, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to stress on a category of victims usually not explicitly addressed. This is particularly important within certain cultural and religious environments. This concerns, for example, women in some Muslim communities, (and potentially children in other communities) who might be forced to become suicide bombers.

During years 2000-2005, there were 25 large-scale terrorist attacks in Russia with participation of suicide-bombers. Majority of suicide bombers were women. Some of them were forced to become terrorists. The problem is very serious and there is a concern that parentless children might be used to play the same role too. This type of victims is typically ignored and not taken care of, though, this is actually very important in view of necessary measures to prevent terrorist attacks.

Addressing the needs of this category of victims is very important, but as this support and assistance is required before the terrorist attack, this generally falls within preventative measures to be taken by states and societies.

There is also a question is what kinds of terrorist activities are required to deal with them. We can differ **three time-oriented groups of processes** selected by degree of close proximity to the time of the attack. Each group then may include one or more phases and a number of involved processes. “**Immediate**” is a group of processes occurring before or directly on time of the attack. This includes pre-phase and hot phase. “**Short-term**” is a group of processes occurring directly after the attack, specifically, as soon as rescue services may enter the site and start acting. Typically, this set of activities completes with victims being discharged from hospitals and returning back to their homes. “**Long-term**” is a group of processes occurring typically during prolonged period, and is dealing with consequences and negative influences of the attack.

There are six categories of victims and three time-driven categories of processes regarding assistance and support to be provided. Therefore, we can divide processes, taking

dimension of time in consideration, into **immediate** (on attack), **short-term** and **long-term** assistance and support. Those assistance and support normally provided to responders on regular base (according to their contract) are routinely excluded from this consideration.

What kind of assistance and support must be provided during each phase to each category of victims?.

Direct victims. In a case of so-called continuous emergency (hostage taking, hijacking), there should be no disclosure of any sensitive information about victims. It may concern information about religion, citizenship, position, influential relatives, etc. When it is appropriate, organisation of necessary supply of water, food, medicaments, etc should be provided.

For category of **witnesses and bystanders**: first, it is necessary to evacuate all of them from the scene; those who need medical and psychological assistance must be provided that; and important one, it is necessary to give at least brief information about event. Relatives must be informed that their relatives were impacted. In case of hostage taking all up-dated information about situation must be delivered. Those who need medical support must get it. It is vital to provide psychological support to all close associates. In case of continuous emergency, relatives should be divided into small groups with assign psychologist and paramedical to each group. For wider group of population (the same applies to friends, associates, neighbours etc) hot lines (info gathering, dispatching) and help lines (psycho assistance) should be created.

First responders and those professionals who assist them must be briefly informed what is happened and what to expect about timing and conditions of their work. They should be backed by adequate medical and psychological support (the last one is especially vital).

Society must be informed about event as quickly as possible. Numbers of help and hot lines must be delivered via all possible means of communication.

Short-term assistance to direct victims has **six** major steps:

1. On-the-spot treatment and evacuation;
2. Assigning identification and local on-site pre-hospitalisation treatment, typically carries out at a central location next to the incident scene;
3. Victims sorting, dispatching and transporting;
4. Hospitalisation (medical treatment);
5. Discharge from hospitals;
6. Rehabilitation of victims and relatives (just after event);
7. Victim-witness protection program should be introduced if necessary.

Secondary victims (relatives) have to be: informed about conditions and locations of their beloved ones; transported to the site when it is necessary; provided by accommodation and food; provided by access to medical and, more importantly to psychological support; assisted with all paperwork, transporting of body, financial assistance with funeral etc in case of death of relative; parentless children have to be provided by immediate legal and financial assistance.

First responders and those who assist them must be informed about event (special press releases) and be provided by medical and psychological assistance.

Bystanders and witnesses from this phase can be transferred to the group of general public (society). Population must be informed about development of event and have access to help lines. Victim-witness protection program should be introduced if necessary.

Post-event medical and psychological rehabilitation (starts immediately after event and runs short-term) includes six major steps:

In order to properly arrange such assistance the following information should be known:

1. Number of victims,
2. Contact and other information about victims and their relatives,
3. Type of impact survived,
4. History of treatment during the crisis,
5. History of treatment beyond the crisis (read, before the crisis),
6. And, therefore, the type of help the supporting services can and should provide.

We should have victims and relatives receiving qualified help and assistance from relevant services, typically consultation of psychologists, medical treatment or financial support.

“Psychological first aid” must be introduced in all crisis response plans. That is why, the participation of those familiar with psychological and psychiatric issues will be critical to all phases of planning for preparedness at the local and state level.

Concerning the relatives, it is possible to take certain estimates into account, for example, saying that normally there will be 3-4 relatives who need help and who are associated with one victim. All such information, when available, allows proper activities planning and resource allocation, what is the necessary foundation for the success of the whole effort. If the assistance is not properly arranged, the anger is growing among the population and the trust to authorities is largely undermined.

The psychological and emotional after-effects of a major disaster are more severe and longer lasting when the disaster results in significant numbers of fatalities, seriously injured victims, and destroyed businesses and homes. Those most personally touched are likely to experience the greatest suffering. Surviving victims and bereaved families will experience a range of short- and long-term impacts that are emotional, physical, financial, and legal.

It is important that governmental and other support agencies foster community healing through respectful and equal healing of all who seeks services.

Direct victims need medical assistance on long-term basis. The same applies to psychological (psychiatric, when necessary) surveillance. Status of victim of terrorist attack must be clearly defined in legal term. Financial compensation for material and moral damages should be provided. Awareness program informing victims about their rights and benefits should be introduced. Relatives who lost members of families should have legal and financial assistance. They also should have access to psychological assistance. Responders and those who assist them should be informed about lessons learned and general information about investigation. Medical and psychological assistance should be provided, especially for those who continue to work with victims on long-term basis. New trainings should be provided according to after-event considerations. Public should be informed about investigation and victims assistance programs. Psychological assistance should be available via help lines. Civil defence information should be delivered with after-event consideration.

Psychological aspects of the support for victims of terrorist attacks

Dr Maria John – Borys from the Center of the Psychological Assistance in Situations of Crisis, University of Silesia addressed the issue of psychological support for the victims of terrorism. Psychological interventions in situations involving terrorism require a fundamental understanding of the traumatic elements of terror. The severity of trauma is measured by, among other factors, the duration of the event, the number of people killed, the age of the victims, and the defenselessness of the victims. The traumatic impact is also magnified by the fact that acts of terrorism occur by human design. Terrorism acts are deliberate and planned, they are sudden and completely unpredictable, and they are aimed at people who are in defenseless position. The great threat of terrorism is that anyone, anytime, anywhere can be a

target. No one is immune; no one is protected²⁵. Psychology developed efficient methods how to eliminated *post traumatic stress disorder*. For those who survive terrorist attack is also important the way in which local authorities treat person who died during outrage. It is usual for a local community to recognise a major incident with fatalities with an early service. This may take the form of acknowledging the disaster in regular weekly services or a specific memorial service for the disaster. In the event of a specific memorial service soon after the incident, the following points should be considered²⁶:

1. Where identification has been confirmed, families of the deceased and survivors, along with responding organizations and emergency services, should be invited. This is a challenging task in the early days because not all facts will be known and some may have to travel some distance, perhaps from other countries;

2. Funerals of some of the victims may not have taken place and an early memorial service may either conflict with a funeral or be very difficult for a family to cope with so close to a funeral. Some people may feel an obligation to attend such a public event whereas they may prefer it to take place later – perhaps on the first anniversary of the incident;

3. The media may wish to cover the service. Appropriate media coverage may take time to arrange, and excluding the media may be viewed as heavy-handed and denying others who could not attend the service an opportunity to see it;

4. A formal memorial service should be planned properly, with full consultation with the families concerned. It is advisable therefore not to describe locally held services specifically as ‘memorial’.

²⁵ *Final Report American Psychological Association. Task Force on the Mental Health Response to the Oklahoma City Bombing*, July 1997, s. p. 1; See also: R.J. Urasno, C.S. Fullerton, A.E. Norwood: *Terrorism and disaster: individual and community mental health interventions*, Cabrigde University Press 2003.

²⁶ See: *The needs of faith communities in major emergencies: some guidelines*, produced by the Home Office and Cabinet Office, July 2005, p. 9.

CONCLUSIONS

The most general conclusion, and even truism, flowing from the seminar in Katowice is that terrorism is still a complex, controversial, and contested concept²⁷. However proper understanding of this fact is a precondition of efficient fight with these phenomena. Understanding should be treated as a key to any terrorism prevention policy. Detail conclusions directed especially to the local authorities can be presented in the following remarks:

1. There exist two important factors, which determine the success of local antiterrorism policy. One means close, based on mutual confidence, relations between local authorities and community. It is especially important in the context of prevention. The second one is reliable system of communication, which means sharing information and coordination of actions between different bodies, both before, during and after the terrorist attacks;

2. There is a need to ensure better cohesion and coordination of actions between national and local governments (*vertical dimension*), as well as between different local communities (*horizontal dimension*). In the latter case, relations should be based on equality. Good example of such cooperation are British Local Resilience Forums (LFRs);

3. Local authorities need legislative corset passed at national level (see i.e. British Civil Contingences Act 2004) for providing effective antiterrorist policy. This is the first condition of efficient policy. Such act should be created in consultation with local authorities;

4. Local authorities should develop closer cooperation with private entities (companies, shops, factories etc.) to ensure better level of antiterrorist architectural protection. There is a need for a consistent local actions directed to inform local societies about terrorism threats;

5. There is no need for one model of architectural protection – it should be determined by local conditions;

6. Regarding the cost of architectural protection, local authorities should concentrate on the most vulnerable buildings and places, as well as protect people from flying fragmentation comes from terrorist attack – it is impossible to avoid all losses, but some can be simply avoided with not too much afford;

²⁷ D. O'Hair, R. Heath, and G. Ledlow (Eds.): *Community preparedness and response to terrorism*, Westport, CT: Praeger 2005, p. 9.

7. Local Police forces should be established and develop close relations with local communities. Confidence between law enforcement forces and local society and efficient Police intelligence service is a key point in any Police antiterrorist preventive activity;

8. Police local forces should have precise emergency response plan in the event of terrorist outrage. It should be produced with close cooperation with local authorities;

9. It is necessary to create integrated rescue system in the case of terrorist outrage. Fire-departments are well-prepared to be a strong part of such system;

10. Local communities can support local fire-departments through additional financial funds which can be assigned on shopping new equipment;

11. The most important factors for the local communities in the context of bioterrorism preparedness and response are early detection of an event and enhanced disease tracking in the population during an emergency response;

12. Energy security needs to build sea terminals, which is the cheapest way to secure continuity of oil and gas supplies. On the other hand this type of delivery is very sensitive and can easily become aim of potential terrorist outrage. This is an important problem for the communities which are located at seacoast. That is why sea terminals and oil and gas storages, should be, if it is possible, located far from dense populated area. Local authorities should participate in the protection of energetic infrastructure. There should be cooperation between activities at national and local level;

13. There is a need to develop coordinated approach to emergency planning. Local authorities should have possibility to consult the guidelines and should subject management of governmental level in this range;

14. Local authorities should in their emergency planning widely use volunteers. People eager to help, i.e. radio amateurs can be valuable replenishment. This system is commonly used all over Europe, i. e. in Germany, Poland, UK;

15. There is no need to create one rescue center at the level of each local community. It is better to establish less number of rescue centers, serving few local communities and supervise by regional administration. However, this model can be used only in some European states. In smaller or centralised states (i.e. Portugal) there is no need to create rescue centers which are autonomous from the government;

16. Emergency planning should take into account relations with media. It is very important because public perception of rescue actions is created mostly under influence of media transmissions. The idea is not that only one center should be authorized to give

information about crises situation; there should be one center that would control the content of information and few centers which distribute information;

17. First precondition to help people involved in terrorists act needs to define status of the victims of terrorism. This should be done through national legislation, but sometimes local authorities stand before necessity of solving this problem by their own;

18. Local authorities should remember not only about primary (direct) victim, but also about secondary and tertiary (indirect) victims;

19. Local authorities should have at their disposal well – prepared psychologists teams, ready to give help. In some countries this is a real problem and legislative gap, because apart police and fire-department psychologists there is nobody who could care about mental health of the victims. Remedy for this can be wider use of professional prepared volunteers – psychologists. We can not underestimate the positive influence of clergy (Christian, Muslim, Jewish).

Many times during seminar in Katowice, but also during other events organised in the framework of “CAT” project appeared a urgent need to define term “*terrorism*”. Proper definition of terrorism is a condition of effective fight with these phenomena, not only at international or national level, but also at local dimension. For the present we can observe notional devaluation of this term. As aimly noticed C. Gearty word *terrorism* includes such broad scope of issues that freely using of this word is “*too dangerous to be accepted in democratic system based on rational foundations*”²⁸. Local communities should remember about this fact planning their antiterrorist policy.

²⁸ C. Gearty: *Terroryzm*, Warszawa 1998, s. 54.

NOTE ABOUT SEMINAR EXPERTS:

P. Podinspektor Jacek Bartoszek

Chief of the Antiterrorist Branch, Central Investigation Bureau, Headquarters of Polish Police

He is a police officer with 21 years of professional experiences. He graduated higher law and administrative study at Police Academy in Szczytno (1986 – 1989).

From 1994 he has been working in special branch of Polish Police – Central Investigation Bureau. In the scope of his duties remains grave criminal offences with the use of explosives and murders. His special attention is concentrated on the matter of crisis management and coordination of actions between police units and other services.

He graduated special professional courses in USA (1996 – course organized by Federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire Weapon Office), Germany (2002 – course organized by Federal Criminal Office), Hungary (2006 – course “Role of police commandants in antiterrorist prevention” organized by FBI Academy in Budapest and US Department of State). He also attended course “Methods of conducting in the case of bioterrorist attack”, organized by Spanish Guardia Civil (2005).

Married. His wife – Małgorzata is a civil servant working for local authorities. He has two kids.

Dr Maria John-Borys

Psychologist, didactician, Institute of Psychology University of Silesia in Katowice.
Head of Socio-Clinical Psychology of Young People Unit (Pracownia Psychologii Kliniczno - Wychowawczej Dzieci i Młodzieży).

Coach of psychological group training recommended by Polish Society of Psychology (Polskie Towarzystwo Psychologiczne).

In the scope of her scientific research remains questions of psychological health of young people, as well as human behavior in crisis situations.

He was designated by the Rector of Silesian University to the task of creating Center of Psychological Support in Crisis Situations.

Mr. Guy Collyer

Guy Collyer is a career police officer with 25 years of experience. This has been mostly focused on criminal investigations and Special Branch related work. In 2002 Guy was seconded from Hampshire Constabulary to the National Counter Terrorism Security Office based in London.

Since that time Guy has become a specialist in biological terrorism and the protection of pathogens and toxins in the UK. He has published several guidance documents and sits on several central government committees'. He has also given presentations on this subject for Interpol, the European Commission and other notable organisations across the globe.

He has maintained his interest in the causes of crime and the effects of environment design and lectures on the principles of preventing and reducing the impact of terrorism, using building methods and proven environment design practice.

Guy has two post graduate qualifications and is a member of the Security Institute and the Institute for Safety in Technology Research. In his spare time he is escorted by his daughter to England or Wasps rugby matches.

Commissioner Grzegorz Kamienowski

Director of the Silesian Crisis Management Center. He graduated Higher Police School in Szczytno and politology at Akademia Świętokrzyska. Participant of courses organized by Higher Police School, Main School of Fire-Protection (Główna Szkoła Pożarnictwa) in Warsaw, Academy of National Defence in Warsaw (among others Higher Defence Course dedicated to higher administrative staff).

He has been working in Provincional Headquarters of Polish Police in Katowice from 1992. In the scope of his professional duties remains preparation of police operations, international sports events and VIPs security.

As an expert of Crisis Management Team of Provincional Headquarters of Polish Police in Katowice (Zespół Zarządzania Kryzysowego Sztabu Policji KWP w Katowicach), he was responsible for antiterrorism preventions, as well as preparation of Silesian Province in the event of war, state of emergency and other disasters.

Mrs. Lina Kolesnikova

Lina Kolesnikova is an expert for Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). She is also an Associate of CS&A (International Risk and Crisis Management) consultancy and Member in the European Speakers Bureau. She provides consultancy in the area of international relations, security, risk and crisis management to number of organisations within both the private and public sectors.

Lina is a researcher with particular expertise in terrorist challenges to the security of Russia (domestic and international terrorism) and terrorist organisations on OSCE area. She also deals with topics of border security management, anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism and law enforcement bodies, terrorism and the media.

Her primary interests are European security, practice of risk assessment as it applies to international relations; and negotiations as an instrument of crisis management.

Lina has organised a number of conferences and seminars in Russia bringing together the interests and experiences of academics, politicians, who have direct experience of dealing with the national and international challenges, and youth organisations.

Her latest publications include articles on crisis management in the Crisis Response Journal.

Lina holds an MA Degree in History (Novosibirsk State University, Russia), a Post-graduate Degree in International and European Relations (Amsterdam School of International Relations, the Netherlands) and a Post-graduate Degree in Risk, Crisis and Disaster Management (Leicester University, UK).

She also holds certificates from the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) on peacekeeping and international conflict resolution, global terrorism, arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, international humanitarian law, and negotiation of financial transactions.

Prof. DSWE dr hab. Krzysztof Kubiak, kmdr. por. rez.

He graduated Polish Naval College in 1989 and University of Gdańsk (master of political science). Doctor of military sciences (1998), finished his habilitation in 2003 at the Academy of National Defence. From 2005 he has been Head of International Security Unit (Zakład Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego) at Lower Silesian School of Higher Education in Wrocław (Dolnośląska Szkoła Wyższej Edukacji). He has also provided lectures at Polish Naval College.

Author of several articles devoted to sea terrorisms, international security and energetical security.

Mr. Spencer Webster,

Head of Risk and Emergency Planning, Halton Borough Council.

He has been employed in Local Government service for 37 years in counties councils, metropolitan and now unitary council, in a variety of roles, not always in risk and emergency planning, but associated activities.

He has been involved in the response to many numerous and varied incidents e.g. Major Chemical incidents, Hillsborough Football Disaster and Terrorism related bomb attacks in Warrington, Crewe, Macclesfield. Actively involved at Regional level, chairing the Regional Mass Evacuation Group, and member of Regional Infectious Disease, and Transport groups respectively. Facilitated a multi agency CBRN live exercise and demonstration in which over 300 personnel took part. Other emergency planning activities too numerous to mention.

Married to Joan, now a retired civil servant, and blessed with two daughters Rachel and Elizabeth. Outside interests include lay reader in a local church, rugby league, gardening, walking.

Dr Anna Szczerba – Sachs
Deputy Director of the Provincial Health and Epidemiology Service

Nadbrygadier Janusz Skulich
Chief of Silesian Fire - Department

He was born in 1963 in Jaworzno. He graduated Main Fire-Protection School (Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej) in Warsaw (1987 – master engineer of fire-protection).

He has been working in Provincial Fire-Department from 1988, initially in prevention unit, and then in operational unit. Head of Operational Planning Unit of Provincial Fire-Department (1997). Deputy Chief of Silesian Fire-Department (1998). Chief of Silesian Fire-Department (2002).

Active participant and head of fire – fighting operations (big forest fire in Kuźnia Raciborska in 1992, antiflood action in Racibórz in 1997, refinery fire in Trzebinia in 2002, rescue actions during the catastrophe of exposition center in Katowice in 2006).

Married, he has a son. His hobby is informatics.

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