



Report

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Organised within the project

SecuCities Cities against Terrorism

Training local representatives in facing terrorism

By
The University of the West of England in Bristol (UK)
and
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Preventing Terrorism - Bristol Seminar report

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1. Executive Summary

This first seminar in a series of five took place in central Bristol on 28 and 29 September 2006. Over the two days it was attended by 30 people, including police, municipal emergency planning officers, security specialists and academics.

This particular seminar focused on what could be done to prevent terrorism, with some attention to minimising the harms and disruption caused by terrorist incidents (covered by an extended simulation exercise).

There was critique of a purely "warfare" or deterrence approach, as well as attempts by governments to feed off citizen's fears and legislate their way out of the problem. It was recognised that the media can be counter-productive in their coverage of terrorist attacks and threats, by fuelling fear and giving terrorists the publicity they desire.

The theme that came out strongly from this seminar is that prevention through both situational and social interventions is the key to a sustainable reduction in terrorism; otherwise we will just be chasing an increasing number of would-be terrorists in the hope that we can thwart their next planned attack. Another theme was the importance of communication, negotiation and conflict resolution as means to defusing existing terrorist threats. It was understood that there is a need to recognise "difference" and respect, within limits, people's rights to hold different political views and cultural aspirations. It is often prejudice and intolerance by the prevailing society and its agents that fuel extremism.

The skills and knowledge for both prevention and mediation already exist within local authorities and voluntary organisations, as they are techniques regularly used for effective crime prevention. However, many local authorities and government departments have hived off terrorism as a separate topic to

be addressed by others (notably the security services and police), rather than as dealing with it as a part of what they do already to prevent crime and minimise harms.

2. Overview and development of the seminar theme

The discussion below attempts to summarise and develop the core theme of the Bristol Seminar, which was the need to take a fresh approach to reducing the threat of terrorism by taking a more preventative stance that necessarily involves municipalities and other agents, rather than the historically prevalent approach of covert intelligence and military-based tactics.

2.1 Fighting talk

Is "fighting" terrorism by declaring a "war" on terrorists, the best approach for solving this terrible problem?. History has taught us that using aggression to repress aggression is a blunt approach that can initially make things worse by fanning the flames. Even when there is a winner in such conflicts, the loser is likely to harbour resentments that could explode once more, when the opportunity arises. The British Government has recognised this and has required it's employees to stop referring to a "war" (see www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1968714,00.html)

What, then, might be an ethically and legally defensible response to security concerns raised by the recent terrorist events around the globe?

First of all, because of the ideological charge implicit in the treatment of the subject, it would seem more advisable to seek a definition of "terrorist acts" or of "terrorist actions" rather than terrorism in general, considering the fact that there is a great deal of reluctance to designate certain groups as "terrorist organisations" when they are seeking to demand certain rights, especially when these have been recognised by the international community. To attempt a qualification of "terrorist acts" would lessen the ideological charge inherent in the discussion, help to attain consensus with respect to a general definition of terrorism and would not hamper punishment and condemnation of certain

acts, regardless of the entity, organisation, or actors that perpetrate or directly or indirectly, support them.¹

There is an argument for a fresh approach - one that is based on what we have learnt about effective prevention of other crimes. After all, once you have stripped away the hysteria and moral panic about it, terrorism is just another type of crime (ie: an act prohibited by law) (Terrorism in its current form is considered as an international/universal crime yet it lacks a universally accepted definition)

2.2 A faceless enemy?

Those of us with backgrounds in crime prevention and supervision of offenders (on probation and doing community service) have had the privilege of getting to know many people who have committed crimes. This is indeed a "privilege" because it has given us the opportunity to better understand the personality traits, personal backgrounds, cultures and circumstances of offenders. One of the things people working with "criminals" discover is that they are proper people, despite the terminology ascribed to them by sections of the popular press. Similarly, we need to recognise that terrorists are also "people" who have antecedents, beliefs and experiences that they use to justify their actions. Far from being "mindless", terrorists, even more than many other types of criminal, are very thoughtful about what they do, coolly planning their atrocities and finding ways to justify what they do (however irrational it may seem to us). The trouble with a "war" on terrorism is that, as with other types of war, it dehumanises the "enemy" and thus misses opportunities to understand and then do something about, their motivation and rationale. The 'war' on terrorism, an activity which in its current form is

¹ Similar approach is also suggested by the lawyers of the Organisation of American States in *Legal Aspects of Terrorism: Contributions to International Legal Writings, Comparative Study of the Principal International Agreements in the Field, and Treatment of the Topic Within the International Law Commission of the United Nations*, OAS Doc. OAS/Ser.G/CP/CAJP-1069 (February 21, 1996) (prepared for the Working Group on Terrorism of the Committee on Judicial and Political Affairs)

primarily non-state in nature.² Therefore, we are faced with individuals who are not encompassed in the trappings of statehood. Hence the laws governing the conduct/behaviour of the parties involved are difficult to invoke.³

The “war” against terrorism should be treated as an international crime control operation and as Fitzpatrick put it is a “hearts and minds” struggle.⁴ Therefore, counterterrorism policies must be crafted with this reality in mind, and short-term domestic political gain should not drive policy at the cost of long-term domestic and international security. Instead, policing and deterrence should occupy a secondary role in law enforcement efforts to counteract terrorism, with priority placed on multilateral and national criminal investigation, prosecution and prevention.

The “war” against terrorism is destined to be morally unsatisfying because, if the phrase is taken at face value, it flies in the face of a wide-spectrum of definitions most people use to describe right and wrong. Framing policies around the proposition that terrorism can be defined and must be opposed may counter the interests of these states who are waging this war. More and more these countries are finding themselves caught between the policies they need to adopt and the language they are using to describe them.⁵ Rather than proclaiming to be engaged in a necessarily nebulous war on terrorism, one

² See Tarik Kochi, ‘Terror in the Name of Human Rights’, 7 *Melbourne Journal of International Law* [2006] No.1, 127 and A. Cassese, ‘Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’, *European Journal of International Law*, available at: <www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-cassese.html> and A. Pellet, ‘No, This is not War’, *European Journal of International Law*, available at: <www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-pellet.html>. Arguably, by using such a term justification is sought so that ordinary rule of law is deviated and instead the laws of war may be applied. For further comment, see Brice Dickson, ‘Law Versus Terrorism: Can Law Win?’, 1 *EHRLR* [2005] 11.

³ Schmid and Crelinsten define terrorism as the “peacetime equivalent of war crimes: acts that would, if carried out by a government in war, violate the Geneva Convention 1949.” Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, Western Responses to Terrorism, (London: Frank Cass, 1993) at 13. Also see, Wayne McCormack, Legal Responses to Terrorism, (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2005)

⁴ Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Terrorism and Migration’, The American Society of International Law – Task Force on Terrorism, October 2002 available at: <<http://www.asil.org/taskforce/fitzpatr.pdf>>.

⁵ For instance, Bush administration has created a diplomatic crisis when it claimed that states such as Iran and North-Korea who are developing nuclear technology were terrorists. Or Israel claiming moral high ground by pointing to methods their opponents employ and Palestinians refusing to accept Israel’s proposals for peace in the face of continuing its occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

should instead accept that we are dealing with a less grandiose and more specific question of national security and/or a criminal activity.

For a successful strategy as evidenced in Northern Ireland, such questions may be posed: Does this legislation work and if so for whom? How many people have been successfully prosecuted under anti-terror laws? Does it have a deterrent value? Do politicians really believe in the legislation? What unintended harm has occurred? How is terrorism defined? Does the legislation deal with the causes of terrorism?

As we have learnt with effective crime prevention, we need to know what makes people offend and what would make them desist, then act accordingly to prevent or reduce the chances of an offence occurring.

So how do we prevent crime? There are three main ways:

1. deterrence through the criminal justice system
2. situational prevention (opportunity reduction)
3. social prevention (reducing the motivation to offend)

2.3 Repression and alienation

Perhaps these can be linked to the affirmation by the United Nations Security Council, asserting that dealing with the root causes and prevention of terrorism is the most appropriate strategy in countering terrorism.⁶ In many countries, including the U.S., the UK and Australia, the policy changes have been argued to be essential in combating terrorism which is seen to be the

⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (14 September 2005). Also see, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 'Root Causes of Terrorism; Findings From an International Expert Meeting in Oslo – 9-11 June 2003', available at: <http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Root_Causes_report.pdf>; Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, 'Responding to Terrorism: Where Conflict Prevention and Resolution Fit In', Address by Gareth Evans at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS), 9 October 2001, available at; <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2227&l=1>>.

most serious threat to national security.⁷ These laws were passed as part of legislative packages propelled through parliaments in record time, without thorough consideration of the need for them or their effectiveness.⁸ These measures represent a symbolic instrument of deterrence directed at a perceived clash of civilisations,⁹ as a politically convenient way of demonstrating a strong reaction to terrorist attacks, and as steeped in a long tradition of reserving the most severe restrictions of the right to liberty, to foreign citizens.

In practice, most of these polices do little to advance public safety, instead they create insecurities for sections of the community and alienate them. While prevention and dealing with the root causes of terrorism are the most appropriate measures in countering terrorism, we would argue that none of the legal responses to international terrorism focus on the latter part of this strategy. As a consequence countries involved in such a strategy are running the risk of alienating targeted groups whose cooperation is indispensable to countering terrorism.¹⁰ Moreover, reliability of purely nationality-based anti-

⁷ Because the September 11 hijackers were non-citizens who had entered the United States through immigration control procedures, the policy response to the attacks inevitably includes immigration measures. Some reforms are salutary, such as better management and sharing of intelligence data on entrants. On the other hand, some of the changes inflict fundamental unfairness on non-citizens, with little if any enhancement in security.

⁸ Elizabeth A. Palmer, *House Passes Anti-Terrorism Bill That Tracks White House's Wishes*, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Oct. 13, 2001, at 2399. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT, ANTITERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY BILL: FURTHER REPORT, 2001–2002, H.L. 51, 2001–2002 H.C. 420, para. 2, available at, <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/35/3504.htm>.

⁹ All three governments mentioned here have argued that the current terrorist threat is a war against their freedom and Western values. See speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Labour Party Conference, Glasgow, February 15 2003, at <www.labour.org.uk>; remarks by President Bush, 'The Middle East: A Vision for the Future', U.S. Department of State, International Information Programme, 19 May 2003, at <www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/text2003/0519ter.htm> and J. Howard, 'Uniting Australia', *The Age*, March 21 2003, at <www.theage.com>.

¹⁰ The Newton Committee stated that they had "heard evidence that the existence of these powers, and uncertainty about them, has led to understandable disquiet among some parts of the Muslim population." PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 REVIEW: REPORT, Dec. 18, 2003, para 196; The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe wrote that the powers clearly have had "a negative affect [sic] on both the perception of Muslims by the rest of the population and the confidence of many Muslims in the fairness of the executive," Council of Europe, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights, on his Visit to the United Kingdom*, para. 32, CommDH (2005) 6 (June 8, 2005); and both the Leader of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain and the President of the Muslim Association of Britain have criticised them as stigmatising Muslims and fuelling

terrorist screening is highly questionable. For instance, Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, citizens respectively of France and the United Kingdom entered the US under the visa waiver programme; and those responsible for the 7/7 London bombings were all British citizens. In fact, it is the indistinguishability of these terrorists from either welcome visitors or nationals that makes preventive action difficult and costly and may result in the adoption of unduly harsh and restrictive control measures.

In regards to prevention; it can be notoriously difficult to evaluate the role that particular tactics, strategies and policy have played, if any, in preventing terrorist attacks or for that matter, in increasing their likelihood.¹¹ The efficacy of current counter-terrorism measures in disrupting possible future terrorist attacks has been hotly disputed.¹² Governments will claim that these tactics are targeted at exactly those against whom there is not sufficient evidence for bringing charges. However, it would not seem completely unreasonable to expect that after months, or even years of detention, the authorities would be able to bring at least some of these cases before the courts.

Vincent Cannistraro, former head of counter-terrorism at the C.I.A., described the government's strategy as "shake the trees and hope that something will fall out" – a strategy that in the short term "might have value and can disrupt terrorist acts, but whose success is difficult to prove."¹³ He suggested that

extremism. LIBERTY (National Council for Civil Liberties), *The Impact of Anti-Terrorism Powers on the British Muslim Population*, (2004), available at, <www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/resources/policy-papers/2004/anti-terror-impact-britmuslim.PDF>. Similarly, the U.S. anti-terror initiatives have reportedly contributed to a feeling of alienation and stigmatization among the Muslim and Arab communities in the United States. See NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic, *supra* note 90, at 425–26; and David Cole, *Enemy Aliens*, 54 *Stanford Law Review* [2002] 953, 986.

¹¹ "We have to question the way we use a power that causes so much pain to the community we serve but results in so few arrests or charges", Andy Hayman, The Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner, BBC News, 12 December 2006, available at, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6171775.stm>.

¹² For the summary of these discussions and opinions see, National Immigration Forum, 'Liberty and Security: Diverse Voices Speak on the Government's Actions to Restrict Civil Liberties and Due Process Since September 11', available at; <http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/DueProcessPost911/CLRA_Quotes.pdf>.

¹³ Quoted in Donald Kerwin, 'Undermining Antiterrorism', *America*, June 2003 at 12.

cooperation and long-term relationship building between communities are more successful strategies to pursue.¹⁴

Not surprisingly, most terrorist arrests and prosecutions in the US and the UK alike since 9/11 have resulted from traditional law enforcement techniques and provisions, not the recent anti-terrorism laws. For example, in the UK the successful prosecution of Abu Hamza, radical Muslim cleric, for inciting murder, was made under Section 4 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 and similarly, Zacarias Moussaoui, one of the 9/11 terrorists, was convicted last May¹⁵ under Conspiracy to Murder Act¹⁶ and Conspiracy to Destroy Property Act.¹⁷

2.4 Learning from proven precedents

Terrorism can be prevented in the same three ways as most other types of crime. As with other crimes, most societies put a lot of energy into the criminal justice system, less into situational prevention and even less into social prevention. This is the wrong way round - until we put more effort into dealing with the reasons why some people become so alienated, indoctrinated, frustrated, and angry, that they are motivated to commit acts of terrorism, we will never resolve the problem, only contain it to a greater or lesser extent. Trying to deter or fight terrorism using criminal justice, militaristic and opportunity reduction methods, may be necessary as a short-term reaction, but such approaches risk making the aspiring terrorist even more devious and inventive. This is particularly the case with the newer waves of terrorism, where people are eager to sacrifice their own lives to achieve their ends. At a stroke, the potential deterrence of arrest and punishment becomes meaningless and the traditional need to have a means of escape after the act becomes unnecessary. Furthermore, as terrorists become more elusive there is a danger that the law and its enforcement becomes more oppressive, affecting the lives and liberties of innocent people who just happen to part of

¹⁴ Ibid. at 12.

¹⁵ *United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui*, Cr. No. 01-455-A [2006]

¹⁶ Conspiracy to Murder United States [1940] (18 U.S.C. §§ 1114 & 1117) (Count Five).

¹⁷ Conspiracy to Destroy Property [1970] (18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f), (i), (n)) (Count Six).

the communities where terrorists might be. (The experience of ordinary Irish people living both in Ulster and England during the troubles, being a case in point) Indeed, the general Irish community living in mainland Britain were stigmatised by their accents and names at the height of the IRA bombing campaigns.¹⁸ Opportunity reduction also can become an escalating series of infringements and inconveniences, such as the recent requirement to remove footwear and abandon liquids at airport security checkpoints. How long will this go on for and where will it stop? - It may be only a matter of time before ingenious terrorists find a way to impregnate clothing with explosive material!

Social prevention (through personal development interventions, education, community relations, mediation, conflict resolution, youth work etc.) is a complex and long term process, but is the only way we can sustain lower levels of terror. It also has the added benefit of leading to more harmonious, inclusive and tolerant societies. The famous Perry/ Hi-scope pre-school education project in the USA (upon which the UK's Sure-Start programme was based) not only reduced levels of criminality when the target group grew up, but also improved their health and employment prospects in later years. Extremist views often take hold when minority groups are marginalized or excluded from mainstream society, while inclusive policies tend to “reduce economic insecurity and the social conditions that fuel forms of “religious – political extremisms”¹⁹.

Prevention should include anticipating and then doing something positive to avert the next potential source of terrorism, rather than waiting for some extremist group (whether it be animal liberationists or religious fundamentalists) to form and then react by capturing them just before they act. If we just react to current terrorist threats, we may miss the opportunity to prevent festering resentments that could lead to extreme acts in the future, whether that be disaffected nationalists or anti-globalisation activists. We

¹⁸ Paddy Hillvard, Suspect Communities: People's Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain, (London: Pluto Press Ltd., 1993)

¹⁹ Burgoon, B. (2004) “On Welfare and terror: Social welfare Policies and Political –Economic Roots of Terrorism”, Working paper ASSR-WPO407 Amsterdam School for Social Science

need to talk, to understand, to mediate, to reconcile, not just to fight a futile and risky war.

2.5 The Politics of fear

So, you may ask, if crime prevention and community safety approaches to terrorism could be so much more effective, why do governments persist with a “war” on terror? Some critical commentators have suggested that it is in Governments' interest to be seen to be fighting a war against terror for (at least) two reasons. For many generations political parties tended to get elected on the promise of material improvements for the citizenry (prosperity for all, health services, education etc.) Now, in the West at least, enough of the electorate have seen their material standards improve, for aspiring governments to need another theme to “hook” the electorate. Some political commentators argue that this new vote-catcher is “protection” - the government that gets elected is the one that promises to best protect its people from dangers and threats. This has become known as the “politics of fear”. The thing that currently makes people most fearful, is the possibility becoming a victim of crime and particularly random acts of terrorism. Thus, fighting a vigorous war against terrorism is a sign of strong government that will appeal to a frightened electorate. Secondly, as with the crime control and war industry generally, there is a huge vested economic interest in fighting terrorism for as long as possible, without end, because, if we managed to substantially reduce the terrorist threat, many people involved in intelligence and security services would lose work, along with the manufacturers of security installations and equipment, who would see their profits evaporate. This latter point may sound too much like a conspiracy theory for some, but it should be noted that the security industry (everything from CCTV manufacturers to private guardian services) is one of the UK's biggest commercial growth areas and one of the few public services that is substantially *increasing* its recruitment is MI5 (The British Interior Security Service).

2.6 More laws?

Also it is worth noting that emergency legislation passed as a consequence of catastrophes resulting from terrorist acts has a predictable pattern. Exchanges between the executive and legislature so that they are seen by the media and the public to be doing “something”²⁰ and the enactment of previously prepared emergency Bills are all evident in the countries such as the UK, the U.S. and Australia.²¹ It is argued that it is often easier to pass new legislation than to examine why it is that existing legislation, and the powers granted under it to governments and their agencies, is not sufficient.²² This allows government to demonstrate that it is doing something against the dangers facing the nation rather than sitting idly.²³ Indeed, such reactions are often supported by citizens who want to see their government getting “tough”.

In Britain there has been a plethora of new laws introduced in the last few decades, aimed at making it easier to arrest, detain and convict suspected terrorists. These attempts to “legislate out” terrorism started during the IRA troubles but have gathered momentum during the more recent threats and actions by Islamic extremists. The risk is that they have gone too far, with the result that they are impinging on civil liberties and are being used heavily-handedly against certain ethnic minority groups who feel even more persecuted and marginalised as a result. They may only serve to drive terrorist groups further underground and to radicalise individuals who had

²⁰ “At a time of threat, to be seen to be doing something rather than nothing is a natural human – and perhaps particularly ministerial – reaction.” Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, House of Lords, Official Report, Nov. 27, 2001, col. 199. Also see David Blunkett, “Circumstance and public opinion demand urgent and appropriate action after September 11th attacks.” House Commons, Official Report, Dec. 19, 2001, col. 22.

²¹ The prevailing belief may be that if new offences are added to the criminal code and the scope of existing offences broadened, and if the arsenal of law enforcement agencies is enhanced by putting at their disposal more sweeping powers to search and seize, to eavesdrop, to interrogate, to detain without trial, and to deport, the country will be more secure and better able to face the emergency. See Kent Roach, ‘The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism’, in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (Eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), pages 138-42; see also Conor Gearty, Airy-Fairy, *London Review of Books*, Nov. 29, 2001, at 9.

²² Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?’, 112 *Yale Law Journal*, [2003] No. 5, page 1032.

²³ Francis Wheen, *Bill That Costs Too Much*, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 2, 1998.

been previously "sitting on the fence" or at least generate sympathy amongst minority communities who may be more inclined to harbour extremists or at least not collaborate with the police. The recent debacle in Forest Gate, East London, where a house was stormed by police, who subsequently found no evidence of terrorist plots, must have done serious damage to community relations in this predominantly Muslim neighbourhood.

The above observations are not meant to imply that military style intelligence activities, legislation, opportunity reduction and harm minimisation (through emergency planning etc) are unnecessary or irrelevant; just that they need to be part of a more comprehensive strategy for reducing the incidence of terrorism.

We need to spend more time and effort on:

Using psychology to understand and prevent the development of a terrorist frame of mind and sociology to understand the development of terrorist sub-cultures

Learning from history (for example the experience in Northern Ireland) and parallel examples such as the failing "war on drugs".

Learning from the research and experience of alternative dispute resolution, mediation, conciliation and other techniques that require communication and negotiation rather than covert intelligence and overt force. (This is based on the assumption that the other party (in this instance the terrorist) is willing to participate in such a dialogue. However, it may be the case that terrorists, especially those aligned to Islamic fundamentalism may not agree to this as freedom of speech and democratic process allows individuals to have sovereignty, a right which may not be permitted by their views and beliefs!!!)

2.7 The media - help or hindrance?

We should also examine the influence of the media in: amplifying the impact of terrorist attacks, generating greater fear amongst the public and framing (possibly inappropriate) policy responses to the terrorist threat. There seems to be an increasing tendency for politicians to implement reactive policies

based on the demands of tabloid editorials, rather than cool assessments of what works. As with other crime reporting, the media generally exacerbate crime related problems, by exaggerating risk and providing prurient (usually gory, emotionally loaded or intrusive) details that are actually counter-productive to a long-term resolution of the problem. It has been noted that terrorist attacks are usually undertaken in daylight, to provide optimum photo-opportunities to maximise publicity on television and in the papers for the terrorists, who rely on mass hysteria for their influence.

Empirical research shows us that social forces influence the legislator and amplify and distort our judgement about risk, particularly in emotionally charged situations.²⁴ Although there is much to be learned from the past mistakes made in times of emergencies, experience also tells us that old mistakes will unfortunately be repeated.²⁵ Arnaud Blin²⁶ reminds us that terrorism is nothing new and most of the techniques for both committing terrorist acts and countering them have been around for millennia; yet many people seem to think that we are in a new age of threat for which there is no precedent. Over 2000 years ago, Jewish Sicarians used terror to generate awareness of their oppression at the hands of the Romans; there are many other examples, and, unless we learn the lessons from these past experiences, we will continue making costly and tragic mistakes in the future²⁷.

²⁴ See, Cass Sunstein, 'Terrorism and Probability Neglect', *The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* [2003] Vol. 26, 121; Cass Sunstein, 'The Laws of Fear', *Harvard Law Review* [2002] Vol.115 1119; and Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk, (London: Earthscan Publications, 2000).

²⁵ Oren Gross, 'Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?', 112 *Yale Law Journal* [2003] No. 5. While terrorists are lawless and operate outside the sphere of legal principles, rules, and norms, democratic governments must be careful not to fight terrorism with lawless means. Otherwise, they may only succeed in defeating terrorism at the expense of losing the democratic nature of the society in whose defence they are fighting.

²⁶ Arnaud Blin (2006) 'Democracy, urbanization and terrorism: what history can tell us'. Paper presented at the Lisbon Seminar on Cities against terrorism organised by the European Forum for Urban Security.

²⁷ Hess, H. (2003) "Like Zealots and Romans: Terrorism and the Empire in the 21st Century, Crime, Law and Social Change"

2.8 Who needs to act?

The kinds of activity implied in the discussion above require a much broader range of participants than those currently tasked to prevent and counter terrorism. The diagram below shows the various concentric circles of influence in the prevention of terrorism. Accepting that terrorists are people with families and living in communities, the primary influences (and observers of changing behaviour) are going to be parents and peers. Beyond this are the mainstream services provided by local authorities and NGOs (such as personal social services, education, planning and community development) who need to recognise that they have a significant role in the long-term prevention of the conditions that "breed" terrorism. Currently, in the UK, the only section of the local authority that thinks it has anything to do with terrorism is the emergency planning department. Otherwise it is seen as a job for the police and national security services.



The British Crime and Disorder Act (1998) requires (among other things) every local authority department to consider the crime reduction implications of what it does and then to act to maximise the community safety possibilities of its day-to-day services. As terrorism is a crime, there is already a statutory requirement for local authorities and other public agencies, such as the health service, to play their part in preventing it, yet this is rarely integrated explicitly into their strategies. At a national level this separation for tackling terrorism is also apparent in departmental organisation and policy processes.

2.9 What local authorities in Britain are and could be doing to reduce the risk and impact of terrorism

Despite the caveats above, local authorities in the UK are doing much work at many levels that, either directly or indirectly, help to prevent and reduce the impact of terrorism. There are huge variations between local authorities in terms of explicit initiatives to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks, but this is entirely appropriate. History has taught us that capital cities and major metropolitan areas are vastly more at risk than provincial cities and small towns. In the last forty years nearly all terrorist attacks in England have occurred in the inner city area of London; the only exceptions being one attack each in Birmingham and Manchester (the next two largest cities in England) and, surprisingly, an IRA explosion in St Helen's Lancashire - a medium sized industrial town. It is therefore not surprising that the inner city boroughs of London (and most notably Westminster) have the most sophisticated terrorism prevention strategies, ranging through partnership arrangements, situational and social approaches. Using Westminster as a best practice case study and Northern Ireland as a historical precedent for reducing the risk of terrorism, the following three areas of intervention can be usefully identified:

1. Partnership, cooperation and communication.

Cities and local authorities should not be alone in the prevention of terrorism. Chief executives should be encouraged to reinforce partnership inside their administrations (emergency planning and community safety) as well as outside the city halls (Police, NGOs, business community, housing services, citizens, civil society). Reinforcing civil leadership and empowering communities that have skills, competences and responsibilities to e.g. report or observe abnormal behaviours, aggressiveness etc. Helping citizens understand the role of local agencies and agents (signposting, leading and explaining). Building communication strategies and modernising communication infrastructures. Special attention should be paid to communication prior and during any crisis situation. Structured communication programmes should aim to reassure the public and restore their confidence (but maintain their vigilance). Many of these approaches are being taken in the City of Westminster, London, but this is the exception, rather than the rule. Communication of data and data protection is a challenge in the UK, both between agencies and from agencies to the public, because of the Data Protection Act, but the crime and Disorder Act does allow data sharing when it would help to prevent crime (and of course this includes terrorism). Preventing terrorism should be included in local crime and disorder strategies and community safety officers should be involved in Security and Counter Terrorism and Contingency Planning. However, the question remains as to whether reducing the risk and impact of terrorism should be placed under community safety or emergency planning departments. Close relations between both community safety and emergency planning are necessary since the former has a good insight into the community and the latter has more technical understandings, but often little understanding of the potential for community engagement. (An exception to this is the Swedish "robust and invincible town" approach²⁸ Another option, maybe the most appropriate one, is mainstreaming prevention of terrorism actions throughout local safety strategies and indeed this appears to be the approach taken in the local authority of Westminster. There is a need to formally justify these activities in national legislation and in anti-terrorist planning.

2. Designing out terrorism by the local authorities

This should be justifiable, viewed as necessary as part of the area's crime reduction strategy and proportional to the degree of risk. Efforts should be made to find the balance between the needs of the public and security policy which could, for example, constrain public freedoms. It should be also required for local police architectural liaison officers to be consulted by local authority planners, over the terrorist risks in the proposed designs for new inner city developments. Section 17 of 1998 Crime and Disorder Act obliges local authorities to consider crime reduction in all activities, but the biggest challenge is to make the government and cities recognise terrorism as a type of crime within their Crime and Disorder reduction Strategies. Even though

²⁸ Robustness in the Physical Environment (1999) and The Invincible Town (1995) The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning [OCB] Stockholm

there is no particular legislation for designing out terrorism, local authorities should be encouraged to produce some guidelines. As some argue, these guidelines might be mandatory, but discretionary, as their implementation would need to be proportional to the actual location risk. In any case, risk assessment is already mandatory for any construction project, in the UK, so terrorism could be added to the existing criteria. "Designing out Terrorism" can be an extension of the "Designing out Crime" approach already well embedded in the UK (see www.securedbydesign.com). As with good crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) physical interventions that prevent terrorism are often best when they are subtle, rather than blatant signs of fortification. The photograph below (of the frontage to a high risk premises in central London) shows no hostile barrier, yet the features (including the pool and raised plinths have been specifically installed to prevent terrorists getting bomb-laden vehicles close to the building and also to make any suspicious people trying to approach on foot, highly visible:



Trying to design out terrorism, like many other situational approaches to crime prevention, does have its downside. The most problematic of this, is displacement, either to another location or another means of attack. It is likely that as a result of many symbolic buildings (such as the Houses of Parliament and the offices of the City of London) being made much more secure against attack, that terrorists have resorted to targeting public transport, which is much more difficult to secure without unacceptable inconvenience to law-abiding travellers. As with criminal justice approaches, this is not to say that "opportunity reduction" approaches to designing out terrorism should not be used, just they need to be part of a broader strategy, which includes social initiatives.

3. Social and equality approaches to prevent terrorism

Preventing terrorism requires more effective interventions to build and reinforce social and community cohesion. Therefore, no new legislation is necessary, but a wider strategy of social inclusion should be implemented, accompanied by the methods to reduce all sorts of discrimination. Participation of citizens should be also promoted at all times. Empowerment and equality are a key fundamentals for preventing terrorism at the community level - making citizens feel co-responsible for joint activities. (on the basis of the Northern Ireland experiences). Elements of this might include: targeting social needs, fair employment legislation, education reforms (e.g. education for mutual understanding, teaching Catholics, Protestants and Muslims respect for different cultures and positions, cross-community programmes). At the root of all this is the aim of achieving community cohesion, reducing social exclusion and detection of radicalisation e.g. more frequent dialogue with disaffected and marginalised groups (particularly of young people) and carrying out risk assessment of communities to identify groups threatened by radicalisation. In this respect, the role of a community diversity officer is crucial. Furthermore, the mainstream youth and community development work carried out in Britain by local authorities and NGOs should be seen as indirectly preventing the kind of marginalisation and alienation that can lead to certain individuals and groups feeling they have little to lose by taking extreme action.

2.10 Norms, morals and prejudice

It is argued that morals are simply adopted by members of a particular society without any conscious critical evaluation and that this cultural conditioning goes largely undetected — members of the group do not appreciate the extent to which their moral convictions are ‘culture-bound’.²⁹ Furthermore, Renteln regards ethnocentrism as the natural partner of enculturation, arguing that when members of a particular community adopt their preferred moral code, it is natural that they perceive its normative value to extend beyond the confines of their own cultural group.³⁰ Consequently if and when a cultural group is asked to resolve a particular moral dilemma or a problem such as ‘terrorism’ it will answer by applying its own moral standards, regardless of the

²⁹ Rhoda Howard, ‘Dignity, Community, and Human Rights’ in Abdullahi An-Na’im (ed), *Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1992) at 75-76. The same can be said regarding how certain rights are interpreted and upheld. See Colin Harvey, ‘Talking About Human Rights’, 5 *E.H.R.L.R.* [2004] 500 examining different theories behind human rights discourse.

³⁰ *Supra* note Howard, at 74-75.

cultural context in which the problem arises. Any alternative moral code, which may lead to a different answer, will inevitably be rejected as inadequate.³¹ Such faith in the superiority of a moral code, clouded by subjective prejudices,³² makes objective judgment impossible and can be considered as moral imperialism and lead to divisions and conflicts both within states and between states as well as between communities. Therefore, one could argue that in recent years we have seen a clash of moral values with legal rights within the public domain in general and particularly in the judiciary. For example, while the UK government tried to apply different rules and conditions to non-citizens and argued that this strategy was effective, the House of Lords rejected such policy and found that not only was it discriminatory but also questioned the effectiveness and proportionality of such response.³³ "Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community... The real threat to the life of nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these."³⁴

Finally, some considerate observers (particularly from other ethnic backgrounds) have noted that Westerners could perhaps be less arrogant about seeing themselves as the "civilising" force that can ride roughshod over other cultures and sensitivities, because Westerners see themselves as the true standard bearers of "progress". Although the notions of civilisation and "progress" are contentious ones amongst philosophers and social theorists

³¹ *Ibid*, at 75.

³² For instance, after the attacks of September 11, the majority of those detained and questioned were Muslim and/or Arabic origin. See The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, *The USA PATRIOT Act: Impact on the Arab and Muslim American Community – Analysis and Recommendations*, available at, <www.ispu.us>. In addition, according to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program, 481 hate crimes were documented against Muslim and Arab Americans in 2001, a massive increase from 28 cases reported in 2000. See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Uniform Crime Reporting Program, 'Hate Crime Statistics, 2001', available at <www.fbi.gov/ucr/o1hate.pdf>.

³³ *A v SSHD* [2004] UKHL 56 (It was held that the preventive detention powers of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), passed by British Parliament in November 2001, violated the non-discrimination guarantee of Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because no reasonable and objective justification existed for limiting the scope of their application to *foreign* terrorist suspects).

³⁴ *Ibid*, at paras. 96-97.

(particularly in this so-called "post-modern" era), we Westerners need to pragmatically recognise that there are substantial sections of the world's population who are not inclined to defer to the hegemony of a democratic, science-based, secular globalism, particularly when free-market capitalism is added to the mix!

Unlike the interstate conflicts of the 20th century, the 21st century conflicts emerging through global terror correspond to the flexibility of their antithesis, the informal global economy. They depend on diasporas and friendly states, and have a propensity to spread through displaced persons, migrants and transnational networks that can no longer be civilized by the nation state.

Although globalisation cannot be reversed, efforts at conflict resolution, management and prevention must – if they are to be successful – focus on a reversal of the conflicts that have been unleashed by globalization. Primarily there has to be legitimate authority. But this cannot be based on policies spousing western hegemony and economic dominance; if the violence that now confronts us is to be pushed from view, there must be multi-layered authority at the local, regional and global levels that recognizes difference in its own terms.

Without such a pragmatic recognition of "difference" we can easily resort to prejudice, racism and exclusion³⁵, which only serve to inflame the sensibilities of groups of people who, for whatever reasons of history and culture, see the world differently and feel they are entitled to do so. Terrorists usually aim to introduce a different type of social organisation, based on their own views and unless we recognise this and in some cases respect the rights of diverse groups and cultures to hold different views (even if we do not respect the way they are trying to go about imposing these views and aims) we will not be able to bridge the gulf that bars the route to negotiation, de-escalation and resolution. Only by "building bridges" are we likely to be able to find a

³⁵ See for example 'Islamophobia - its features and dangers' published by the Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, published in 1997, which notes that "Islamophobia increases the likelihood of serious social disorder, with consequent high costs for the economy and for the justice system. Islamophobia makes it more difficult for moderate voices and influences within Muslim communities to be heard, and on the contrary drives them into the hands of extremists and feeds 'Westophobic' opinion" (p15).

common ground where some difference can be accommodated, but where *everyone* agrees that certain attitudes and acts are unacceptable.

3. Synthesis of key presentations and discussions

DAY 1

Working together in partnership to prevent emergence of threat of terrorism

John Baradell (Westminster City Council), Dean Ingledew (Metropolitan Police);

Along with the City of London, Westminster is the most central municipal district of London, containing key institutions such as the Houses of Parliament, Whitehall (government offices) and Buckingham Palace. It also contains most of central London's shopping and leisure facilities as well as a large amount of housing, for both high and low income residents. It is therefore one of the areas most highly at risk of terrorist attacks in the UK.

Conscious of this, the Council and the relevant division of the Metropolitan Police have worked together to prevent terrorism by applying community safety approaches.

During the period 2003-06, surveys of local communities in Westminster put crime issues as something that the Council should prioritise action on. During this period crime has been falling- this is the result of Community Engagement.

Social and cultural exclusion is a major threat to engagement & partnership working to achieve safer communities, so the Council and police have put considerable effort into improving communication and dialogue (for example: Project Griffin).

If the communities that terrorists hide in are more integrated and included, those with terrorist inclinations are more isolated, less protected and people may inform on them.

By stigmatising and excluding some communities and subcultures, there is a risk that some of their members become more criminal.- and they become more 'hidden' & underground.

In Westminster, the police and council use the same agendas, targets and data systems. They use Councillors to spread the message and also use resident groups effectively. Awareness information about safety and prevention is disseminated at all stages eg: to mothers at the point of refuse collection etc

Historically Councils have been most likely to direct anything to do with 'terrorism' to 'Emergency Planning departments' & not Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. The problem is that Emergency Planning officers lack

training/awareness about community safety & have nothing to do with creating Community Cohesion /building relationships. The way that the funding & budgets work in local authorities has a big influence on how different departments operate and (fail to) interact.

Designing Out Terrorism

Guy Collyer, NaCTSO

Prevention of terrorism should be mainstreamed throughout all the departments of local authorities. In terms of "designing out terrorism" this means that City Planning Departments and Building Control Departments could play an important role, along with police architectural liaison officers and counter terrorism security advisors.

Certain situational locations are vastly more attractive to terrorists than others. The current target choice is one that will provide: maximum casualties, vulnerable people, maximum media exposure and will send out wide ripples of fear among the wider population.

Crime Prevention through Environmental design (www.CPTED.com) is a series of principles developed to "design out crime". With some adaption, these principles can be developed to help prevent or limit the damage of terrorist attacks. Examples would be:

- Laminated glass
- Framed structures
- Robustness clause (all heights) in granting building permission
- provide bombshelter areas
- Precast Concrete or Solid Masonary Cladding
- Stand off distances, to keep people and bomber vehicles away from targets

In the USA, the National Capital Planning Commission (www.ncpc.gov) is responsible for developing situational security guidance for Washington DC. Their website contains reports that elaborate on this topic.

In terms of "designing out terrorism" there are two crucial factors to be addressed:

- A planning role – get these things planned into new designs
- There should be regulations that say new builds/ high risk properties have to be designed (or redesigned) with the prevention of terrorism in mind.

The effects of the London bombings on transport safety

John Strutton- Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership Manager, London Underground & Transport for London www.tfl.gov.uk

Section 17 Crime & Disorder Act (England and Wales) is the key to giving local authorities a mandate to prevent terrorism. Transport for London (the authority responsible for public transport and vehicle circulation in London) has acknowledged this with the drafting of its own Crime and Disorder reduction Strategy. Subsumed within this is a section on tackling the threat of terrorism to public transport:

The increased threat of terrorism is one of the greatest challenges facing us today. The tragic attacks on London's transport system in July 2005 reaffirmed the importance of our efforts to enhance safety and security on the network and to reassure those that work and travel on our transport system. The threat of terrorism remains at the forefront of our safety and security agenda.

Much work has been undertaken in response to the lessons learned from July 2005 with the aim of stretching our resilience to the threat of terrorism. We have undertaken a review of our operations to identify options that could deter and limit the impact of potential terrorist attacks on London's transport system. We are making a range of interventions including long term investment in infrastructure, improved operational procedures, staffing levels and policing initiatives that will help to safeguard the transport system from potential attacks. These interventions have been carefully balanced against the needs of passengers who use the system to go about their daily lives.

A TfL (Transport for London) resilience group was set up in late 2005 to oversee and coordinate our efforts in this area. This forum will ensure we have a robust and integrated resilience plans across all of the TfL's operational businesses. Joint security arrangements and emergency response plans with the police and emergency services are in place to ensure that we are well prepared to deter or respond to potential attacks. These plans are reviews and tested regularly.

Objective

- To deter and limit the impact of potential terrorist attacks on the transport network

Key Actions

Enforcement

- Undertake high visibility policing patrols across the transport network
- Further develop standard deployment patterns for the TfL and police staff and tactics to be implemented to counter threat on day to day basis and in times of heightened alert.

Engagement

- Work with the Metropolitan Police Service, British Transport Police and the various London Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships to support counter-terrorism work in line with the Government's counter-terrorism strategy
- Work closely with other partners on counter-terrorism efforts
- Ensure greater co-ordination and necessary integration of counter – terrorism activities and emergency response plans TfL's operational businesses
- Work with police and emergency services to test emergency response plans through regular simulated and desktop exercises.

Education

- Brief frontline staff on aspects of identifying and responding to unattended items and suspicious packages
- Use our communications campaign (predominantly posters and station announcements) to remind passengers to stay vigilant and report anything suspicious to staff.

Environment

- Further improve the interoperability of communication systems between TfL, police and key partners
- Further develop TfL's CCTV strategy to optimise systems, enhance detection opportunities and sharing of images
- Further develop train radio communications
- Vet staff in line with TfL's recruitment policies and practices and where necessary in line with police security clearance standards

Understanding the terrorist mind (see full paper in appendix)

Professor Jean Claude Salomon

All terrorists have an agenda – it may not be immediately obvious, but the notion that terrorism is some kind of "mindless" activity is not true. Following from this, it should be obvious that, if we want to prevent or reduce terrorism, we should try to understand what potential terrorists are thinking and what motivates them, ie: "get inside their minds". It could be said that all "terrorists" were "normal" people initially; there is no consistent evidence of psychological or psychiatric problems although there are a few leaders who appear to have psychopathological personalities.

Terrorists take a long time to plan attacks, because they need to build relationships,

consider WHEN to do an attack (to achieve maximum damage and impact), identify suitable targets, acquire or build explosives etc. So there should be plenty of opportunity to identify suspicious activities and sudden changes in behaviour?

Even though, through the "cell system" terrorists can appear to be isolated, they are not alone – they are nearly always part of a bigger entity or 'group' even if it is only an ideology or broad movement. (such as anti-government [the Unabomber] or animal rights).

'Civilisation & Violence'- why do British citizens commit terrorist attacks in UK? (see full paper in appendix)

John Lever, researcher, University of the west of England

In order to understand and then tackle the problem of terrorism, as well as taking a psychological view it may also be helpful to study it through a sociological lens.

Britain is the cradle of liberalism and the one of the birth places of Western civilization. The country's values have long been admired around the world and British society has the reputation of being tolerant and multicultural. Recent world events have led to a questioning of these values and some commentators have argued that we are slipping slowly back towards barbarism. But seen from the periphery of the world capitalist system very little has changed, and it is really no surprise that liberalism is starting to reap the benefits of its continued global expansion.

It was the late Norbert Elias (1897-1990) who gave the clearest account of the rise of Western civilisation and the retreat from barbarism that accompanied the emergence of European states. Illustrating how a series of feudal wars gradually pacified larger and larger geographical spaces during the course of the European civilising process, Elias shows how the medieval warrior classes were slowly transformed into a class of courtiers and how, as inter human violence was pushed behind the scenes of everyday life, inequalities slowly lessened as a more civilised form of human conduct became established as the norm.

A crucial aspect of the European state formation process was the balance between the interests of the private sphere and the interests of what Elias called 'state regulated society', a shift from absolutism to nation state that facilitated the development of a strong state apparatus that limited the use of violence to inter-state wars and facilitated the rise of civilised individualism within nation states. In the formative years of liberalism, John Locke put forward the political ideology that accompanied the rise of western individualism, when he argued that those who do not display 'reason' in the appropriate manner cannot give 'rational' consent to political authority or receive the benefits civilised society offers. And today both at home and abroad the ideology of liberalism and the narrative of civilisation continue to categorise inclusion and exclusion by the degree of civility expressed by those seeking to reap the benefits offered by global civil society.

But it has been argued that globalisation has undermined state monopolies and that the balance between the public and private has shifted decisively back in favour of the latter, thereby giving rise to a process that could be described as the opposite of that through which modern state societies emerged. Analysts suggest reductions in public expenditure, a growing informal economy, increasing inequalities, and unemployment and rural urban migration have all combined to weaken the rule of law and strengthen the use of privatised forms of violence. While globalisation may help to break down authoritarian tendencies, the push for democratisation has also unleashed popular ideologies and prejudices restrained for many decades by authoritarianism. These are the circumstances that have given rise to global terror and to the global war on terror.

Highlighting the integration of man into larger and larger survival groups throughout the course of human history, Elias retained faith in the fundamental assumptions of the Enlightenment. But he also highlighted the dangers posed by mans ideological differences, and was convinced that world governance and peace would never ensue until man had overcome the problems posed by such differences. The latest phase of global integration highlights Elias's concerns well. First the castle walls went down; then the borders of the nation state; only the empire stands, and as in Franz Fanon's prophetic narrative of capitalist expansion, the whole process is finally starting to turn in on itself. Unlike interstate wars, the war that is global terror is a war that corresponds to the flexibility of its antithesis, the informal global economy. It depends on diasporas and friendly states, and has a propensity to spread through displaced persons, migrants and transnational networks that can no longer be civilised by the nation state.

Although globalisation cannot be reversed, efforts at conflict resolution, management and prevention must therefore focus on a reversal of the decivilising process that has accompanied globalisation. Primarily there has to be legitimate authority. But this cannot mean a return to statist politics or to a bounded civilising process. There must be multi layered authority at the local, national, regional, and global level if the violence that now confronts us is to be pushed from view once more. As Elias pointed out, the civilising process is not yet finished.

Summary of discussion in day 1

We (in the West) believe in talking/communication, yet Islam believes this is part of democracy & so it isn't relevant because they don't believe in talking. They believe in following the LAW that is written. So it could be said that they are

- not angry/just obeying??
- there may be nothing to understand
- blowing yourself up- is a sacrament like going to church.

Our value systems are so different, it's hard for us to understand their value system & them to understand ours.

Should the aim be to combat terrorism or to get them to give up?

Osama Bin Laden said there is room for dialogue. The West (Bush administration) shut down the lines of communication. There appears to be no dialogue – but lots if terrorists are Westernised.

DAY 2

Simulation exercise - a terrorist attack in a crowded place

Richard Flynn (NaCTSO)

In the UK, terrorist incidents are low frequency but high impact. Despite the IRA experience, the British have not had much chance to "get used to" managing the consequences and minimising the impact of terrorist attacks. One way to prepare for an appropriate response is to carry out a sophisticated simulation exercise. Such an exercise was piloted at the seminar, using video, sound and group activities.

The focus of the exercise was on crowded places (in this case a shopping mall) where an excess of situational measures are not practical for commercial access reasons.

As well as simulations, guides on preventative security and dealing with terrorist incidents are being written in the UK for nightclubs etc. These places can be monitored i.e. numbers are known, but in places like high streets/city centres etc – numbers not monitored; anyone can be there, so they are much more difficult to "manage". Historically Communities have come together in crisis times e.g. war etc

But do people (such as shop and club managers) realise that they have responsibility in relation to terrorism? Under the British Health and Safety Act, businesses have to conduct Risk Assessments but how far does this go and would anything be implemented (because terrorist attack would probably be high impact, but low risk)?

Northern Ireland: transferable lessons for dealing with other terrorist situations

Dr Alan Greer, UWE

We have short memories and quickly forget that the most menacing terrorist threat in the UK over the last fifty years has not been from Islamic extremism, but from the Provisional IRA and its offshoots. Thankfully this particular source of terrorism has more-or-less ceased. Yet 20 years ago, the IRA threat seemed insoluble; so what can we learn from how this went away?

The main measures that succeeded in de-escalating the conflict in Northern Ireland were:

- targeting social need - for example, Ulster must have more leisure centres than anywhere else in the UK

- community development and civil rights - the catholic minority had justifiable grievances, which were gradually addressed.
- Education reform - educate Catholic & Protestant together so they aren't learning segregation & separation of cultures at school
- Communication & dialogue was key. Even when officially there was no negotiation going on with "outlawed groups", covert diplomacy was happening and this eventually worked.

Lessons? Although different, there are useful-comparisons with the current terrorist threats in Europe (there is a direct comparison with Lebanon, Basque Spain & Cyprus). Causes of violence and responses (security/political) are similar in most terrorist situations. So even if the aims of the terrorist group are other than nationalist, there is much to be learnt from previous (successful) experience.

Minimising the breeding grounds of terrorism through community development and social inclusion for immigrant and minority groups

Iqbal Aslam (See full paper in appendix)

This is a personal account from someone of Pakistani Muslim heritage who was brought up in Glasgow and now works in community development in Holland.

- Scotland - went to university etc not because of but in spite of the British system – attitude formed from racism and fear of white people. The legacy of the British Empire means that even the lowest class white person regards themselves as superior to the indigenous people of countries in the empire. When immigration happened, indigenous people had to compete & saw that the whites aren't better. This has led to anger amongst (particularly) young people from ethnic minorities in the UK.
- Holland- on the surface has a reputation for liberalism and tolerance. However they have been very strict on letting people into the country at all. They forbade other languages/mosques. Before racism was hidden, possibly as a result of political correctness, but as the country has lurched to the right, racism is now obvious. In Holland more than 50% say black people are a problem. They are treated as 2nd class citizens.
- Exclusion = disillusionment and anger. The only option is to give up all of your own culture, then you have more chance of being accepted /included. There is a need to link into local groups in their own environment- not expect them to come to your culture, but go to theirs. Community should be thriving e.g. inclusion, but even though some public agencies want to engage this is more of a token engagement
- It's probably too late to change attitudes amongst some disillusioned young men from ethnic minorities. So is there a critical age at which

attitudes /anger are formed? It is likely to be in the pre-teens and this suggests the point at which positive, integrative interventions should occur to prevent the development of extremist attitudes in the future.

Minority Faith Protective Security Initiative

Pete Nash & Dylan Aplin (Counter Terrorist and Security Advisers) Avon and Somerset Constabulary

This is a very different approach by the British police to tackling terrorism, by building bridges between the police and minority groups. This particular initiative aims to increase the trust between minority communities at places of worship, the Police Service and wider public authorities. Its objectives are:

1. To engage with communities at places of worship, make sustainable contacts and provide 'signposts' to Support Services.
2. To deliver enhanced protective security measures at the places of worship (the focus of community life), thus protecting communities and reducing their vulnerability to crime.

The current world political situation means that all minority groups can unreasonably be branded as 'terrorists'. This means that they become more susceptible to extremist activity. There appears also to be a prevailing climate of 'Islamophobia' in the country. The initiative seeks proactively, through a process of target hardening, coupled with 'bridge building' to: both protect the places of worship of minority communities from extremist activity (racist attack, criminal damage or violence), and at the same time increased trust and awareness between the Police Service, other public authorities and minority communities, will reduce their vulnerability to crime.

Analysis of reported hate crime around a minority place of worship on one beat alone, has established a disproportionately high number of offences for that area. The work will also increase the confidence of victims to report offences and reduces the fear of crime.

Once installed, the additional security measures would be self-supporting, although subject to a review on a regular basis. The links between the Police Service, other public authorities and the minority communities would hopefully also be self-supporting, and would lead to added trust between those involved.

Method

There are 26 identified minority places of worship in the Avon and Somerset Force area (see attached spreadsheet). This project has sought to provide formal protective security advice to these minority faith places of worship and entails:

Establishing the places of worship that require surveys and identifying a suitable 'link' person at each location

A briefed local Crime Reduction Office (CRO) to complete the written survey in an agreed format

A Beat Officer to accompany the CRO

Identifying the needs of the community at the place of worship and providing 'signposts' to support agencies

A SMART action plan to be agreed concerning both the security recommendations and any issues highlighted from within the minority community.

Current Outcomes

To date, 22 of the 26 sites have been visited and surveyed. A considerable amount of work has already been conducted with a number of pilot projects now completed.

A successful bid for funding from the Government Office of the South West (Excellence and Innovation Programme) has elicited £10,000, all of which will be spent at 4 sites by the end of this financial year (prioritised based upon need). By using the Bobby Van, provided by the Safer Bristol Partnership, target hardening has also been conducted at a further 4 sites, up to the value of £250 per site.

It has been necessary to think laterally regarding a number of solutions, without the need for expensive security measures. For example, at the Somali Mosque, Central Mosque and Bangladeshi Mosques in Bristol it has been possible to develop solutions to the concerns of the community with Bristol City Council. We have sought to obtain short-term lets on adjacent derelict property, with a view to assisting with parking and removing the habitat of drunks, thus preventing antisocial behaviour. At a Synagogue in Bristol the provision of a cycle rack made a positive contribution to the well-being of the congregation, who feared a vehicle borne attack. At one mosque, that had previously had no contact with the Police Service, there has now been reporting of a number of crime related incidents.

Finally, the Avon and Somerset Constabulary have tried to address the reluctance of people to talk to police or any other public figure if they have concerns about a family member? The police thought about who can people talk to if they are worried about radicalisation, for example. The concept of an Antiterrorist Hotline is too intimidating for many, so they are proposing that concerned people should telephone Crimestoppers (an independent national non-profit organisation in the UK) which allows for total anonymity and has nothing to do with the police. As part of the publicity about this facility the police try to emphasise the safety of someone who does report suspicions about someone's behaviour by pointing out that there is

No identification

No repercussions

No court appearance etc

So simple tangible forms of help and advice may be able to have a much bigger benefit in terms of building trust and communication, which in the medium term could avoid some of the problems police in the past and in other countries have had in their dealings with excluded and disillusioned minority communities.

4. Conclusion

What is clear in the UK is that the prevention of terrorism has mostly been hived off to the Police, Security Services and Emergency Planning Units, when in fact much prevention and harm reduction work could usefully be achieved through mainstream participation of local authority departments such as education, youth services, community development and planning. This indeed is the approach being taken in the City of Westminster (central London) - historically the local authority in Britain the most at risk from terrorist attacks. No new legislation is needed, given that terrorism is a crime and the British Crime and Disorder Act (1998) already requires local authority participation in crime reduction. What *is* needed is more awareness among mainstream local authority departments (particularly in large cities) of the influence that their strategies and services can have on terrorism prevention and harm minimisation. The first stage, in the UK at least, would be for the police, community safety officers and emergency planning officers in each local authority area to meet together (possibly facilitated by NaCTSO) to work out how their various functions and skills can be pooled and co-ordinated to achieve a partnership approach to minimising the threat of terrorism in their area. Clearly this would have to be commensurate with the level of risk, as history has shown that metropolitan areas are vastly more likely to be targets of terrorism than small towns and rural areas. This can at least partly be achieved through information, education and training, which is the aim of this project. However there appears to be an initial "perception of responsibility" hurdle to be overcome insofar as, currently, local elected representatives and officers in mainstream local authority services on the whole, don't see their various actions as being relevant to preventing terrorism.

5. Supporting Web Bibliography

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Henry Shaftoe and Umut Turksen (with additional material by John Lever and Sara Williams) University of the West of England, Bristol 2007

6. Key papers presented

Designing Out Terrorism

Guy Collyer, NaCTSO

The concept of urban design impacting on criminal behaviour is not a new one. Terrorism is a crime and the same rules apply. Good environmental design has the capability of preventing some forms of terrorism and mitigating the impact of others.

By restricting access to vehicles and the use of electronic counter measures elsewhere, we can make life harder for terrorists. Evidence has shown that the harder one makes it to attack a target, the greater likelihood of a terrorist seeking more vulnerable sites. Although this does not do away with the terrorists threat, by society raising awareness and heightening surveillance, the terrorist makes themselves more likely to be identified and brought to justice.

Under some circumstances, such as attacks where the assailant is willing to die, there is little one can do. This is the point where a reduction in death and injuries can be achieved by good environmental design and planning. The majority of casualties in such incidents are injured by debris flying through the air at high speed. Simple measures such as laminated glass and specially design street furniture can reduce injuries and give people a greater chance of surviving such incidents.

As with all crime prevention techniques, urban design must not be treated in isolation, but should be part of a wide and comprehensive package focused on the long term sustainable reduction in crime/terrorism.

The Mind of the Terrorist (A journey into...)

Jean-Claude Salomon

Introduction

Understanding the terrorist mind is really about prevention. However prevention as we know in the criminal justice arena is a very difficult topic. Does prevention work, how do you measure it, who undertakes prevention are the most common questions and sources of criticism or lack of implication in prevention schemes.

Applying prevention to terrorism besides from neutralisation of terrorists (imprisonment or death) is as yet an uncharted land. Of course the policies of defensible space or target hardening can be transposed to the threat of terrorist attacks. Prevention applied to possible human sources of terrorism is a new field.

We can however begin by attempting to understand the terrorist mind thus getting an insight into motivations which we can alter, group dynamics that we can apply pressure to and more generally attempt to alter individual courses involved in networks. Some experts have spoken about the “hearts and minds” of communities that support, to various degrees terrorists. This is fine but what do you actually do. And what about individuals outside the normal framework? I refer specifically to Europeans who convert and are not members of specific communities.

Some key points:

- The violence of terrorists is simply more focused and organized than that of youths engaged in urban violence or crime.
- The root causes are basically the same.
- The goals are symbolic as well as political/religious, identity or ethnic issues.
- Terrorists are the same as you and I, with the same basic needs, emotions, feelings and aspirations.
- Terrorists are not mad, insane or suffering from pathological disorders though some may be suffering from the results of past PTSD or personality disorders.
- Terrorists are the result of three factors; individual, organizational and environmental. You need all three to have a terrorist, especially today's one.

- One has to take into strong account several key words which explain in part terrorist personality; identification, **self esteem, revenge, frustration, reaction, renown, disaffection, challenge, honour, anger, grievances, conflict, resentment.**
- Today's terrorists do not function in a vacuum or alone but rather are part of networks.
- Terrorist networks are living organisms fuelled by group dynamics.
- These networks are much more elaborate than thought, though they may be poor from logistics points of view.
- Networking is the key to the difference between terrorists and urban violence or some criminal activity.
- From selection, through recruitment training preparation and committing attacks, the network is the key.
- Terrorism is currently real in scope because it works.

Briefing Paper:

When I was first invited to participate in this seminar, I thought "wonderful". Then I had to think of the topic of my presentation, "The Mind of the Terrorist", which was accepted. Afterwards, it dawned on me that I'd chosen a rather difficult subject. Not being a terrorist, what on earth could I say on the subject not being a terrorist myself?

Gradually it grew on me that I did know a little about this subject, from other perspectives. Unlike most people I do know and have known real terrorists, members of guerrilla movements and other violent, armed organizations. No suicide bombers in the lot though or else they didn't live to tell.

I also have my experience as a crime analyst in the *Police Nationale* and chargé de mission working at *l'Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Sécurité Intérieure* with some visible public work in crime prevention and urban violence. Most of my work was however with liaising with other services, analysis and counter terrorism and counter intelligence.

To this background I should add my studies and interest in victimology which I've also applied to the above areas. Victimology is a core component of terrorism and as such must always be taken into account. But victimology also applies to offenders or perpetrators of terrorist acts. Who are they, why did they choose to commit terrorist acts?

So after all it does seem that I may yet be able to speak about the terrorist mind. I won't go through all the boring and too academic stuff about defining terrorism. People in London or Madrid don't need definitions, they know in their flesh what terrorism is.

Now to the heart of the matter; why do such nice young men from our communities go about blowing themselves up along with dozens of other people? How can this happen, here, they must be fanatics, deranged or mad.

I'm afraid that the truth is somewhat simpler and more disturbing. They are not Mad, but people like you or me, perfectly normal who have chosen another course, gone on a different track than most of us. Yet when you think, how many people out there are also off on different tracks than most of us (drugs, alcohol, drop outs of society, recluse or in revolt without acting out).

I will now try to attempt charting this different track taken by terrorists. My attempt will be based through the use of having been a privileged witness to several violent, armed groups over several decades, in various parts of the world (terrorists, guerrilla movements, and liberation fronts), interviews with violent offenders, my operational experience and the looking glass of applied psychology in relation to my victimology studies.

The terrorist mind is a difficult topic not only because of questions of access but also because of much over simplification and misunderstanding. It should be clear that what follows are my own perceptions of terrorism and terrorists.

Lets be clear at the onset, the London four didn't set off their bombs in London but months before elsewhere in England. It could have here in Bristol by the way. Make no mistake, the setting off of the process of becoming terrorist bombers was not the result of going to a mosque, seeing an imam, going to Afghanistan or Pakistan or surfing the web. I'll get back to this point shortly.

Another point, somewhat against the common grain but in my mind and perhaps in the mind of some of our "homemade" terrorists is that the process of becoming a terrorist, suicide or not, has to do with a fairly recent word we use in a totally different context but extremely pertinent to this seminar and urban issues....**empowerment** ! If we understand empowerment to mean controlling one's life and environment though it seems a paradox, that's exactly what the London four demonstrated.

Setting off the London bombs was symbolically done long before and elsewhere, at home in our communities. You don't simply decide one day to become a terrorist or suicide bomber on the spur of the moment and say "hey I'm going to blow myself up the Tube". And you don't just meet someone else you don't really know and say "team up with me; I'm going to blow up the London Tube".

Becoming a terrorist or suicide bomber is a fairly long process. Some would have us believe that all it takes is getting a few lessons in somewhere near

Afghanistan, then just making a bomb in your kitchen, go off with some friends, go on the Tube and boom.

The London and Madrid bombing, among others show that in fact more people are involved than the original bombers. This in itself indicates that we're dealing with a more complex, deeply rooted and organized process than we'd like. Bomb making requires minimum care, expertise and attention when making homemade improvised explosive devices. Choosing a target(s) also requires prior thinking; you don't just go off and explode yourself anywhere, any time.

And if you're doing it as part of a group of four or five, then the whole operation requires coordination, timing, in other words, advanced planning. As they say in the States you want a "big bang for your bucks", so you plan maximum media play up. This invariably means several other people involved in addition to the four dead bombers. In turn, it means that we're dealing with an organized group within a community that may seem to look the other way, through fear, indifference, partial approval or identification with the bombers.

So we do have some precious information; the bombings were part of a long, evolving process involving a number of persons, all located within fairly defined geographical locations and communicating. This also implies that at one point or another some people have been witnesses to parts of their activity.

Further, all studies conducted with terrorists throughout the world, without exception, have shown that perpetrators are not mentally ill or crazy. A person with severe personality disorder could hardly make a stable bomb, chose a target in advance and calmly go to a tube station, get on and blow himself up.

In this case we're dealing with dedicated, committed people who have long term goals (which in this case may include the notion of martyrdom). At this point it is opportune to indicate that though we are looking at suicide bombers related to radical Islamic groups, we could apply the various comments to all other terrorist groups.

Though we are currently focused on terrorists from radical Islam, it remains that other sources of terrorist activity could develop at any time, with similar effects. Animal rights groups also engage in terrorist attacks. In a recent past the *IRA* was engaged in very sophisticated terrorist activity. In Sri Lanka currently the *Tamil Tigers* are again active after a difficult truce.

New groups could and will appear both in our countries as well as elsewhere so we should focus on the why someone wants to become a terrorist and how he (or she) becomes one.

This naturally brings to what these people, what the terrorist mind is about. As already indicated there are no single cause but rather multiple causes and layers of causes. Motivating factors are necessary and are several fold, to bring someone to commit a suicide attack. This has led experts involved in

profiling terrorists or at least trying to understand the terrorist mind to identifying and gaining insights at what motivates terrorists. Various theories have been developed but it seems from the research that no one theory can explain this behaviour.

Frustration aggression is the first motivating factor that comes to our minds. Frustration aggression theories have been very popular but have since been discarded and proven inefficient to fully explain the process leading to terrorism and suicide bombings.

Basically this theory was developed by L.Berkowitz in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* in 1965. For that author terrorist activity is a response to frustration of not attaining personal or environmental goals. In the face of frustration the would-be terrorist "fights" rather than using "flight", our old stress friends. This hypothesis obtained some initial success because of terrorist accounts (autobiographies, interviews) that were auto justifications aimed at appearing as victims of society rather than as perpetrators. At best this hypothesis could apply in part to revolutionary terrorists (*R.A.F.*) but certainly not to religious based terrorists and suicide bombers who demand a totally different commitment.

Another theory was that of narcissism aggression, developed by Hassel in *Terror: the Crime of the privileged* in 1977. In this case narcissism is the manner in which an individual relates to the external world and defends himself from damage and harm. Narcissistic injury is in this case the main mechanism leading to evolving towards an aggressive stance (terrorism) to protect oneself from harm.

A more recent work by Louise Richardson, *What terrorists want*, published in 2005 the author insists on the three Rs, Revenge, Renown and Reaction, as motivating factors of terrorists. If we look closely we'll see that these three factors actually cover the factors mentioned elsewhere in this paper. Revenge of course covers members of families already victims of repression, war or other measures against different types of movements. With more distance, revenge covers Muslims who want to take revenge for actions against their brothers in various parts of the world.

Renown brings into being questions of identity, self esteem, honour and disaffection. These different characteristics all have a positive outcome through renown. Reaction is a fairly clear act arising from anger in many different forms as well as slights, discrimination and other related behaviours.

Reaction in addition to striking out against an action undertaken by the enemy also serves another function. Reaction is sometimes used to spark off repression. *ETA* in the Basque country of Spain sought to provoke the Spanish government into further repression which would lead to further resistance. This repression-resistance cycle was also used in Latin America and by some radical left wing groups in Western Europe. In practice this theory never worked.

These theories and others have since proven only partially valid regarding terrorists but we should look elsewhere to understand the initial personality traits that enable enrolment into terrorist movements. More “common” personality traits and behaviours are worth looking into.

Anger, in my mind is a major component. Its one that I’ve met in violent criminals, conflict situations and armed struggle groups. Dealing with anger is essential because deep rooted anger is at the heart of many conflicts that escalate into violence. Anger arises in a variety of situations and of course some would identify this emotion with frustration. Anger is present when you’re not understood, not being able to say things clearly on the moment. Or, it’s about the slight (s), the humiliations that are implied rather than openly stated. It should also be noted that the accumulation effect only increases the possible reactions.

We should always pay attention to anger, our own as well as that of others. And anger is highly infectious; other people will easily catch your anger and will in turn pass it on to others. A very good remedy against anger is “respect”. Respect at all times is the only way forward and is perhaps one of the best tools against anger, conflict and deviant behaviours that often lead to extreme violence and in this case to terrorism. By the way, “respect” does not mean necessarily agreeing with other opinions or tolerating the unacceptable. It simply means listening to the other fully.

However a funny thing about “respect” is that it works well if showing respect also implies assumed authority, with justice and a clear notion of being “centred” Otherwise respect is only subservient, and an act without substance and in that case will only lead to further “slights” and anger.

If you keep in mind many of the contemporary conflicts such as Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Palestine and the rest, lack of respect (some would say tolerance which is not the same thing) is the common tread in those conflicts and in my mind the engagement of some of our local people into the current terrorist cause.

I made a passing mention about some key words that in my mind are so many fuses that need little to be set off. These are identification, self esteem, revenge, frustration, reaction, renown, disaffection, challenge, honour, anger, grievances and conflict. Conflict and anger have already been covered. Make no mistake, future terrorists all start out with those key words in mind, it can be one or more generally a combination of several of these key words. This is what’s in the terrorist mind at the onset.

Terrorists don’t fall out of the sky; they are made, shaped by all of us in our everyday interaction with others. Of course we can add to the list racism, injustice, inequality, discrimination, arrogance, social deprivation but in the end the basic list remains the core seed bed of terrorists in making.

I like to make an analogy with urban violence (France, November 2005) and some forms of criminal activity. In France as elsewhere urban violence occurs

during which cars and houses are burned. Schools, sports facilities and other equipment are also targets. These forms of urban violence are always qualified by the media and the police as “senseless”. But when you stop and think a moment so are terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are also qualified as “senseless”, brutal, fanatic.

By the way, should we think of linking terrorist behaviour with risk taking among youths? I would tend to think that links are there and should be explored. In risk taking, youths literally risk their lives and want to prove themselves, foremost to themselves but also to others. They also want to see if life has a meaning and last, they want to what limits are.

In the past all societies had elaborate rites of passage from childhood into manhood. Orderlies, risk taking and rites of passage were common. In our modern societies no such exists so we have new forms of risk taking, with lives coming into play and death at the end in quite a few cases. Becoming a suicide bomber isn't all that different. After all at the heart is gaining a meaning in life (and after life), obtaining the statue of a martyr and proving oneself to others.

The perpetrators frequently come some the same general background and live in the same “inner cities”, whether in France or in Britain, as those involved in urban violence. The symbolic values are the same in some instances. However successful a person of immigrant origin is there is always the persistent feeling that he is not quite like the others. He has to be better, explain his success and always has to defend himself.

Youths involved in terrorism and those involved in urban violence and crime are simply two branches of the same tree and with more and more frequent crossovers. In this case drugs are both an excuse to establish control in the name of the war on drugs and yet drugs funds terrorist activities, again a common tree.

In both cases despite the seemingly “senseless” aspect, injustice, honour, identity and apparent control over one's life is at work. Also in both cases, control over one's environment is essential, in the case of urban violence, control over “my territory” and in the case of homemade terrorists, control over “my cause: my identity”.

Self esteem is a good point here. With our urban youths self esteem comes from peer recognition and the presence of the media in reporting the intensity of urban violence and riots. With the terrorists self esteem comes from other members of movements and the religious dimension of reward in an after life. And of course the media also play an essential role in playing up their action. This in turn leads to moral grounds.

The terrorist act also implies a hard criticism to others; it sends a message which in effect says “You see, my cause and my commitment is so strong that I'm willing to die for it”. That's high moral ground and has an impact on persons close to the terrorists. It also sends a message that whatever we try

to do to stop this terrorism, we cannot achieve clear results (true but for different reasons).

The terrorist mind, as already indicated is part of a broader process and includes several levels. An individual who wants to be a terrorist is not sufficient in itself. At best, it will lead to individual terrorist act and at worst it will be something related to suicide by cop.

The successful terrorist and terrorist act requires group involvement. Group involvement can be small as illustrated by the *Rote Armée Fraktion*, with a fairly small backing of supporters and sympathizers. Or it can large as illustrated by the *IRA* or the *P.L.O.* In this case hundreds, thousands of people support both the cause and the action of the terrorists. In this case their action is seen as resistance against oppression.

At this point it is important to look at the question of the suicide option. Why use suicide as a viable means of action rather than the more “traditional” terrorist methods. Suicide terrorism is an impressive act, one hard to counter for several reasons; 1) this type of action is disturbing because unusual, 2) threats of punishment cannot work, 3) the terrorist is on high moral ground, 4) it is cost effective, 5) no problems with possible prisoners.

Suicide attacks like other forms of terrorism remain however techniques or means rather than ends in themselves. This is easily seen with truces carried out by some groups like the *Hamas* who do use suicide attacks as a tool and stop its use when they feel it appropriate. In turn this has several implications concerning the individual terrorists and potential suicide bombers. These are only part of a “stock”, available when necessary. It shows that they are always under control of the organizational level. This level in turn is linked to the third level, the environmental level. This level includes the target population, the support population and the behind the scenes negotiations or contacts.

Jean-Claude Salomon, Paris, September 2006

Civilisation and terrorism: a sociological view?

John Lever, University of the West of England

Abstract: This paper examines the rise of Western Civilisation given by the German sociologist Norbert Elias in his account of the civilising process. It starts off with a brief examination of the European state formation process and the disappearance of violence from everyday life that accompanied it. To explore the possible reversal of these trends, the paper then looks at Elias’s

work on the breakdown of civilisation and the rise of internal terrorism in Germany between the wars, before drawing out some comparisons with recent world developments and the rise of home grown terrorism in the UK. In conclusion, the paper suggests we need to pay more attention to the long term processes that shape the world in which we live. **Keywords:** *Civilisation; Violence; Globalisation; Terrorism; Multiculturalism; Community.*

Introduction

Today I'm going to talk a little about the account of western civilisation given by the late Norbert Elias. It is an account which shows how the emergence of civilized behavior in the West was bound up with the emergence of centralized European states and the removal of violence from everyday life. The paper examines these developments – and their possible reversal – in an attempt to shed some light on the emergence of home grown terrorism in the UK.

For Elias (1994), the emergence of western civilization and civilized standards of behavior were closely bound up with the establishment of public state monopolies over the means of violence and taxation. Discussing the ways in which individuals have been integrated into larger and larger groups throughout the course of human history, Elias shows how a series of elimination contests between warring feudal lords during the Middle Ages gradually facilitated, amongst the European middle classes – who began to coalesce around royal courts during this period – an increasingly civilized code of human conduct. Over time, as these processes advanced, Elias argues that violence was pushed behind the scenes of everyday life as individuals were compelled to develop more foresight and restraint in their relations with other people, and how, as social inequalities decreased, the term *civilisation* was gradually viewed by many in the West simply as an expression of their own cultural superiority (Elias 1994). It is this process that Elias terms the civilising process.

This is a simple summary of some very complex ideas. The thing to remember, however, is that the notion of civilisation, for Elias, emerged unintentionally through a combination of unplanned and planned social development. It should also be remembered that Elias believed humanity would one day be integrated into a single global unit and that a period of world governance would ensue, and in an age when the Holocaust had only recently questioned the western notion of progress, Elias was often accused of putting forward *just another* version of progress theory. However, while it is undeniable that Elias outlined a process of change in very specific direction, he was only too aware of the fragility of the processes he identified. And it's the possible breakdown or reversal of these trends that I'm going to talk about today.

Liberalism, civilisation and violence

If we take it as given that western civilisation was based on the perceived superiority of a particular personality structure from the nineteenth century onwards, we can begin to understand why, at the same time as the 'civilising process' was beginning to unfold across Western Europe, 'civilisation' was attempting to spread itself across the rest of the globe in a most brutal and violent manner. Elaborating on the process involved, it has

been argued that civilisation is thus largely 'accompanied by aggression and violence towards those who remain uncivilised [...] largely because of the threat they pose to the fragility of the achievements of civilisation' (Van Krieken, 1999: 297).

As is well known, a central feature of western political philosophy since the Enlightenment has been the assumption that individuals not born reasonable or rational must undergo a process of 'refinement and education' (van Krieken, 1999). John Locke (1632-1704) argued from such a position during the formative years of liberalism, where he put forward the view that human beings who do not display 'reason' in the appropriate manner cannot receive the benefits civilised society offers. And today, both at home and abroad, the ideology of liberalism and the narrative of civilisation continue to categorise inclusion and exclusion by the degree of civility expressed by those seeking to reap the benefits offered by civil society, a situation which gives the civilised the right to claim control over the autonomy, political sovereignty, and freedom of the uncivilised in order to facilitate their 'assimilation' or 'inclusion'.

These issues involved are clearly illustrated through the workings of community safety partnerships where the government now attempts to reduce crime and disorder, improve safety and security, and maintain control over the use of public space by engaging communities in their own self governance, and much has been made about role of local authorities in these developments. However, it appears that for many working in local government, their everyday working lives has changed very little. Indeed, while communities are being asked to do more for themselves through these developments, it has been argued that the community safety agenda is still being dominated by the priorities of central government who are deploying governance strategies for their own purposes (Lever 2005). Lee's (2004) claim that the *fear of crime* is used as a government tactic to generate self-regulation in this manner clearly illustrates the processes involved in these developments, and many have argued that the *fear of terrorism* is being articulated in much the same way, as a means through which the 'dissemination of dominant discourses of terrorism' is used as a tactic of discipline and control (Mythen and Walklate 2005:12).

The development of domestic control runs alongside the development of Anglo-American foreign policies that seek to bring into line – or civilise – those countries seen to be sympathetic to terrorist networks and organisations, most notably perhaps, after Afghanistan and Iraq, the *axis of evil* comprising Iran, North Korea and Syria. And here again, in keeping with the logic identified, we can see how terrorism is providing a political lens 'through which ulterior motives are being camouflaged and hidden agendas executed' (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 14). Examining these developments more carefully, we can see that individuals, communities and whole populations - in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia - are being stereotyped and labelled deviant through such processes.

Many contemporary academic of these processes clearly illustrate the ways in which governments construct security threats as and when the need arises. Governmentality theory (Foucault 1979), for example, recognises both an inclusive dimension to government through which individuals, communities and countries can find themselves by adhering to liberal demands, and a more authoritarian thread through which awkward and incompatible voices can be marginalized. Within this framework, while those opposed to the 'reprisals' initiated for terrorist attacks on the West are often rebuked for being

unpatriotic, those who support such attacks are often seen as facilitators of truths about terrorism, truths that are increasingly saturating the public sphere (Chomsky, 1989).

However, recent analyses of race relations in the UK have suggested that these accounts illustrate little more than the ways in which the dominant discourses are mobilised in order to support government priorities (Bagguley and Hussain 2003). Following on from this it is my contention that we need to pay more attention to the ways in which the developments that now concern emerged in the first place, rather than simply aligning such problems with the exclusionary policies of neo-liberalism. Whilst an approach that examines the ways in which the terrorist threat is constructed may provide useful insights into the workings of government, an approach that examines such developments whilst casting light on the changes in the social fabric that leads to their emergence is, I would argue, much more valuable. And this is what I'm going to attempt to do by returning to the work of Elias.

Civilisation, violence and terrorism in the 20th century

Although the link between civilisation and progress led many 19th century Europeans to conclude that violence had been confined to the distant past, the Holocaust put this modernist delusion to bed once and for all, and although Elias is often accused of falling into the modernist camp, it is a fundamental misunderstanding of his position to see it as a model of *inevitable* social progress. Indeed, while the gradual control of social danger by the state was a precondition for the emergence of a more civilised code of human conduct, Elias was only too aware that the processes involved swing *to* and *fro* and that the civilising process can always go into reverse.

Discussing the breakdown of civilization in Germany prior to the Second World War Elias (1996) shows how, as the use of violence in politics grew, and people began to act in more uncivilized ways towards each other, the state monopoly of violence grew steadily weaker. Elias's argument, in summary, is that geographical size and the close proximity of antagonistic language groups provided more obstacles to state centralization and democratic values and civilizing institutions in Germany than it did in England and France. As no great court society emerged in Germany to civilize the aristocracy as it had done elsewhere in Europe, it was not until well into the 19th century that a series of wars unified Germany and enhanced the militaristic leanings of large sections of the population. As a result of these traits in the national character, Elias (1996) suggests defeat in the First World War was followed by widespread internal violence as groups sympathetic to the old regime attempted to undermine the new republic through a vicious terrorist campaign that eventually destroyed the republic from within.

Elias (1996) suggests a characteristic stage of the process through which people become terrorists is highlighted in the experiences of the men who fought against the new republic, many of whom felt detached from a society they believed was "rotten to the core" and about to go under (Elias 1996, 192). And it has been argued that it was during this period – rather than under the Nazis – that civilization started to breakdown as violence became a central feature of political life (Fletcher 1997). As I've suggested, these insights do not explain the Holocaust in its entirety. What they do draw attention to however, is how the interplay of planned and unplanned phases of social development and integration – processes that would be later equated with Europeanization and Globalization – facilitated a breakdown in the states ability to control violence, and how,

on coming to power, the National Socialists utilized this situation to bind the country together for their own purposes (Dunning and Mennell 1998). Although there are numerous differences, I believe there are also some similarities between the breakdown of civilization in Germany and recent world events and developments in UK. The following section discusses these issues in more detail.

The post war period: the start of a global civilising process?

After the Second World War, state responsibility for organised violence was attributed to individuals within the German military. A civilised world with a monopoly on intervention emerged and the use of violence by states to expand their borders was criminalized, and it's has been argued that this was the beginning of a global civilising process as envisaged by Elias (Utsumi 2005).

This was not to say, however, that organised state violence disappeared altogether, for while in the past civilised nations had created *external enemies* in order to expand their borders and nation build, developing countries now had to create *internal enemies* in order to nation build, a process which unintentionally generated – in a whole variety of different contexts – internal violence against *enemies of the people*, forms of violence the superpowers supported or opposed as they saw fit (Utsumi 2005). In the rich countries, these developments were accompanied by the emergence of a political consensus given validity by the sacrifices made by the working classes during the war, a period within which many countries experienced sustained economic growth and increased migration to fill the gaps in a booming economy.

The wars that emerged during the later half of the 20th century were directly related to the break up of the social and political relations that had formed the post war world. First of all post colonial societies, and then post socialist societies, suffered crisis of legitimacy and, as the Cold War finally ended, and the full force of globalisation was finally unleashed, violence erupted spontaneously across many areas of the globe. The problems that emerged during these decades – increased crime, disorder and violence – cannot, however, simply be equated with a slow down in the civilising process. They are, many have argued, “something that could be described as its opposite – the unraveling of the process” (Kaldor 2000, 4). Paradoxically, perhaps, the rise of globalisation and the end of the Cold War enhanced the value of multiculturalism substantially, for if the *Triumphant West* was to export its now dominant ideology worldwide, it followed that the diverse internal groups that inhabited Britain must also be fully exploited.

This is a cynical view, I admit, and there is no doubt that multiculturalism can in some ways be seen as a development of the civilising process, as part of the anti racist struggles of the 1960s and 1970s that enhanced the position of many minority groups substantially (Sivanandan 2005). On the other hand, however, seen against the background of the changes I have identified, as an ideology that seeks to strengthen the established world order in the face of wider global pressures, it could be argued that multiculturalism is an attempt to paper over the cracks that emerged as globalisation advanced. And the argument here is that it is not *ethnic pluralism* that is at stake, but rather access to the instruments of cultural (re)production in a globalising world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999). Multiculturalism is, we could say, a *catch-all* ideology for the problems thrown up by globalisation, a way of containing the problems globalisation unleashes by giving currency to all minority groups.

Civilisation, violence and terrorism in the 21st century

Considered in this way, alongside the events that have only recently heightened global tensions between cultural groups, perhaps it is not too surprising that the resulting cultural mix is sometimes volatile and unpredictable (see Taylor 1994). Indeed, the argument that **all** the July 7th bombers were well integrated into the British way of life draws attention to the complex pressures impacting identity formation in 'multicultural Britain' (Sivanandan 2005). As a recent poll suggested, although many British Muslims clearly believed the July 7th bombings were wrong in principle, many also indicated that they believed the cause was right. And here, much as earlier processes of human integration facilitated a sense of unease amongst section of the German population, so we can begin to see why a number of minority groups and cultures in Britain and elsewhere feel threatened and alienated by recent world events.

The most developed account of decivilising processes to date has been given by Jonathan Fletcher (1997) who suggests that any breakdown in the civilising process is most likely to occur in societies where there is a decline in the states control over the means of violence, and where social ties between groups start to fragment. Fletcher suggests further that these developments are likely to be accompanied by tensions between groups, by increases in impulsiveness, and by an increase in thought with a high fantasy content and little relation to reality.

Just how far recent world developments are impacting the diverse functioning of British society remains to be seen, but it does appear that they are pushing British society towards a point at which the social returns from multiculturalism start to diminish, to a point at which the balance between civilising and decivilising processes turns decisively in favour of the latter. While people are undoubtedly more interconnected than at any time in human history, greater connectedness – whilst opening up the possibility of increased identification amongst different cultural groups – also increases the chances that some groups may react aggressively to the advance of alien values (Linklater 2006). One only has to think of the response of UK nationals in October 2005 to the earthquake in northern Pakistan to see the affinity British immigrants have for their ancestral homelands, and here it is not difficult to imagine the contradictory feelings and emotions these groups experience when fellow Muslims are subjected to repressive legislation, detentions and deportations, Muslim countries to invasions, bombing campaigns and 'wars'.

In summary, it appears that by giving consent to any minority position, successive British Governments, whatever their political orientation and motives, have unintentionally created the conditions within which self segregating and alienated communities emerge and from where home grown terrorism sometimes springs. We can see the consequences of multiculturalism on the streets of our cities, where preachers of hate have the right, it appears, to incite hatred and violence as and when they see fit, and, considering everything I have said throughout this paper, I think we can see that there is perhaps a trend towards the increasing acceptability of political violence – both at home and abroad – against all cultural groups.

Final comments

I started off today by discussing the possible integration of humanity at some future point, and there is perhaps a clear tendency towards the monopolization of force on a global level already, with many acts of terror being classified as *acts of war* and *criminal acts* simultaneously. And Hess (2003) is probably right when he suggests that the policy response to terrorism so far can in some ways be seen as the start of a *global war on crime and disorder*.

The logic of this argument is quite compelling, for in the later decades of the 20th century, as technological innovation grew, the cold war ended, and the practices and institutional arrangements of liberal democracy spread, so globalisation has become the focal point of civilisation, with all subsequent wars, in their own way, being a way of civilising cultures, communities and countries existing outside the dominant liberal domain. As is clearly evident, the *'war on terror'* has followed quickly on the coattails of the *'war on poverty'* and the *'war on drugs'*, developments within which any group that opposes the dominant order are now seen as a threat to that social order. Following this line of reasoning through, Hess (2003) argues that although the future might be more peaceful because there will be less wars between nation states, it may not be altogether more peaceful because terrorism will increase as a form of violent crime.

However, it has also been argued that global integration processes are undermining the civilising process at lower levels of integration (Kaldor 2000). And my own research into the governance of community safety has indicated that the short term political solutions now in vogue often make things worse rather better by enhancing the problems communities face in the long term. An increasing number of reports and polls into the governance of terrorism are indicating much the same thing – that policies driven by global rather than local concerns are undermining the institutional foundations of which civilisation actually rests.

My intention today has been to draw attention to the consequences of our continued failure to take account of the long trends that shape the world in which we live. Elias (1987) referred to the process involved as *the retreat of sociologists into the present*, the implication being that social researchers are often so wrapped up in networks of relationships that constrain us to deliver results in short-term that we sometimes do not see the bigger picture. Increasingly, it seems to me, many people working in Local Authorities are constrained by the very same pressures. And what we need to think about, therefore, considering recent world events, is whether the short term appeal to civilisation will, in the long term, actually bring about a more civilised world.

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Minimising the breeding grounds of terrorism through community development and social inclusion for immigrant and minority groups - Iqbal Aslam, Community Development Worker with Stichting Prisma, Holland

I was brought up in the 70's, my parents came to seek their fortune in The United Kingdom and ended up in Glasgow in the early 1960's and 46 years later they are still there. My father was termed unemployable in 1978 and has alternately slept or prayed for the period thereafter. My father's wealth is summed up in 8 children a wife and the roof over his head.

If I hear my parents talk of when they arrived in Scotland, how helpful and friendly people were then I can remember that it was good fun for us too as kids. But then there came a change in Scotland the sphere turned grim. In 1972 our life as happy children growing up in Glasgow changed.

My eldest brother was on his way to school when a group of youth stopped him and beat him up. This was our first association with Paki-bashing...and believe me we all experienced it at one point or other in the years to come.

I would like to go back to one issue which I mentioned about my father...he was as I said deemed unemployable...this was what was stated on his papers which he received from the DHSS. I only came to understand what that meant in the 80's ...but no matter....I ask myself how did it come to be that my father had earned such title. Mohammed Aslam esquire...unemployable.

Well you see while he was working at the railyard he was attacked and stoned by a group of white youths and he defended himself. That was reason enough for his employers at BR to sack him. There was no union which backed my father up nor was there any protest over the fact that he was the victim not the offender. It was a clear cut case he had to go.

Our disillusionment in the British way of life was complete. We were brought up fearing white people most of the time, there was little question of trust and absolutely no room for accepting their way of life. We were brought up the good muslim way. We went to school during the day, we went to the mosque we ate and slept and as soon as we could we went to work so we could help maintain the household. Fortunately as I mentioned some of us even managed to get to college and university. This was not thanks, in our opinion, to the system from our perspective but in spite of it.

But before I lull you all to sleep with tales of my formative years I would like to get to the point at which I now stand. I left Scotland in the early 90's to seek my fortune in the gold paved streets of the Netherlands where my wife comes from.

Holland I hear you all think the land of milk, honey, flower power and tolerance. And indeed what other associations come to mind?...Rembrandt, van Gogh and of course the lovely windmills.

Indeed Holland is the shining example of tolerance and acceptability. I experienced that first hand from my first neighbour who took to cursing my visitors for coming to the flat in which I lived with my girlfriend.

When I was working in the factories I relished the racist sneers which were thrown in the faces of those who spoke little or no Dutch or Frisian (depending on the language the other did not understand).

The Dutch I learnt at that moment was of a level which taught me that forks were for eating with. (tell that to a Glaswegian who uses forks to prune his garden).

The Dutch had a more worrying side which was not so visible to most of the people who came to visit the country.

I learnt very rapidly that the world famed tolerance was only superficial, more of a convenience than anything with true meaning.

No matter, the Dutch do it better than most and so it was that when a refugee centre in Rostock went up in flames the Dutch mustered to the call against bigotry and racism and sent postcards to the German government condemning its lack lustre approach in fighting the extreme right.

And so we get to the present day...the mood in Holland is grim...the legacy of Pim Fortuyn, the flamboyant university professor turned politician who turned Dutch politics on its head, and the subsequent murder of first him and then the film director Theo van Gogh has left gaping scars in the image of Holland. The ensuing No vote on a European Constitution was to the outside world not only a shock but a sign that the Dutch as we knew them were no more.

The political arena has never been more divided. Should Hirsi Ali (or is it Megan) have had her passport revoked? Is Verdonk (minister for integration) a megalomaniac or truly the answer to all evils?

Will Balkenende ever relinquish his throne?

In the shadow of all this is the question how is Dutch society facing up to the present turmoils? The answer to that is badly!

In 2000 the Dutch government tightened its asylum laws, transforming it from the one of the most liberal countries to one of the most strict. From the situation in the mid 90's when approximately 45,000 came to Holland, in 2002 that number had decreased to 18,700 in 2002, and then in 2003 a further 30% decrease in 2003 to 13,400.

In 1999 tensions towards refugees were growing and came to a peak when the 16 year old Marianne Vaatstra was brutally murdered near the northern village of Kollum. Refugees were immediately blamed by authorities and villagers alike as the culprits. To this day the murderer has still not been found.

But, it was the way in which the local population reacted which epitomised the depth to which Dutch society had sunk to. Locals and media alike poured scorn on the refugees and the refugee centre. There was a long stand off between the town and surrounding villages and the refugee centre. People who had come seeking safety in Holland were

now basically besieged by police and villagers. Plans to rebuild and extend the centre were shelved and the centre was closed down.

Refugees were labelled as gold hunters and murderers.

This scenario was a far cry from when the Central Asylum Organisation was set up to help refugees who had till then been forgotten and left to their lot. The Dutch set up the Asylum centres to tackle the problem of refugees having nowhere to go. They had been found sleeping in corn fields in the mid eighties.

The beginning of this millennium was marked by those stepping up to defend the Dutch way the European waythe Judeo Christian way. Others like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (herself a refugee) stepped up to and started a barrage of attacks on on the failure of the state to tackle integration and particularly Islamisation. But Hirsi Ali was seen to be a fighter for the emancipation of women....moslim women....she claimed the title with a vengeance. Because she herself was brought up a Muslim had lived amongst them till she fled to Holland (a refugee) her attacks came as hard blow to minority groups and organisations. She went so far as to call the prophet Mohammed a paedophile who was surrounded by pimps. Moslims were left baffled and insulted. That she could not be prosecuted for her comments...whilst on the other hand those who insulted her were brought to justice left many asking what the score truly was.

Pim Fortuyn began a vicious onslaught on multicultural Holland at the onset of his political career. He declared multiculturalism dead and envisioned a new Holland. This call was picked up by many as the signal to open fire on all that was foreign.

That Holland had changed was in 2001 a fact. It had changed from being so called tolerant to being outright racist.

His subsequent murder (by an animal rights activist) sent massive shock waves through the whole of Dutch society. The politicians in power had no answer to the populist messages which were sent out on a daily basis by Fortuyn. In fact they were seen to be the real murderers of Pim Fortuyn.

In 2002 Rita Verdonk was hailed the champion of the right wing for her tough stance on refugees. She has never budged on the issue of granting a general pardon to the 20,000 people who have been stuck in limbo for up to 10 years. She was even commended for her tough stance when she repatriated a 16 year old Bosnian who wanted to follow her education in Holland. Revoking the passport of a fellow member of parliament (Ayaan Hirsi (Megan officially) Ali)has not made her less popular.

And then came the followers...Theo van Gogh who openly (on live TV) called Moroccans goat fornicators and referred to Moroccan youth as female genitalia. The likes of Geert Wilders who want to forbid the speaking of all foreign languages in mosques and, what the heck, forbid the building of mosques too.

When van Gogh was murdered by a Moroccan in 2004 all the doubts and accusations about fundamentalism and terrorism came to a climax. It had seemed like a disappointment that foreigners had not been to blame for the death of Pim Fortuyn. Now was the time to get even. Mosques and schools were burnt to the ground. The raging right wanted revenge.

The last years have seen politicians, TV presenters, journalists and for that matter every Tom, Dick and Harry (or should I say Piet, Jan, and Klaas) jostling for a position in being the most insulting towards immigrants and in particular to Muslims.

All this time I had a feeling of "déjà vu", I kept on feeling I had experienced this sort of turn before....the seventies in Britain come to mind...sharp divisions in society, lots of racist overtones...Enoch Powell like prophets of doom and gloom.

Who is to blame for the mess we are in now? The foreigners, the Muslims, the Antillians, they have stripped the white man of his place in power. They are to blame for the state of the land, they want to change us into something we are not.

The hypocrisy of the right wing who call for tighter controls on immigration, repatriation of migrants and refugees, the abolition of Muslim schools are once more in the mode.

Surprisingly I heard my wife saying she longed for the years prior to Pim Fortuyn, things were more civilised back then....I wonder what that means now...it gives me a very strange feeling.... you have a society which is inherently racist but then it manages to hide that or you have an openly racist society...which should I choose.

But then again there was a political cordon around the extreme right, they were not taken seriously...they were there but nobody listened or so they say. Now according to the CBS (Dutch Statistics Bureau) 10% of Dutch people openly proclaim themselves to be racists.

But now I would like to turn to the question of community. Perhaps I have diverted attention away from the matter at hand but hopefully you will forgive this transgression as I have attempted to give a mind's eye view of where I'm coming from.

Like Britain in the 50's and 60's the Dutch also compensated for its lack of workers by actively recruiting immigrant labour from abroad. For the Dutch came Antilleans, Indonesians, Surinamers, Turks and Moroccans.

Just like the British no effort was made to integrate them into the communities, they were left to themselves and the mutual expectation was that they would one day go home. Four generations later they are still there.

The immigrants were put in to do menial labour, jobs which the local population considered itself to be too good for. The largest influx of migrant labour was in the big cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag and the surrounding areas. More than often they were put up in cheap rental accommodation and were for the rest forgotten. Those who came later fell prey to so called house milkers (people who bought up run down houses and then rented them out for extortionate prices....exploiting (milking) accommodations for every cent they could get).

Discrimination on the work floor was common practice and today that is not different.

All the indicators show that migrants are twice as likely to be turned down for a job as a white person. Unemployment amongst the migrant communities is twice as high and the vast majority of migrants live on or below the minimum income level.

In Rotterdam it is so that the very areas in which many immigrants have lived are now to be demolished but the residents are no longer welcome in those areas.

Active discrimination policies against those on low income to weed them out of their communities have been deemed lawful.

In the light of all this it is no wonder that many of the migrants who came to Holland feel marginalised and excluded from the society in general. Like my father the first generation has put up with hardships only to be further pushed down the line of poverty.

The chances of the first generation were limited but the third and fourth generations look at the situation differently. They do not accept that they are second class citizens, this very idea is the root of their torment. They did not ask to be born here (in Holland or in Britain). But they are here.

Those who actively pursued an education are invariably disillusioned by the fact that they are excluded from jobs at higher levels and excluded from participating in society at a higher level.

That is unless you are prepared (like Hirsi Ali) to disown your own history and people and pour scorn on all that formed you. This then gives you the credentials of true integration.

Social exclusion is the issue at hand.

You don't get a job.....why..... because you are black or have a foreign name like Ali, Mohammed or Abdul.

You can't get into the disco.....why.....because you are black

You can't get a promotion.....why.....because you are black

You can't get a nice house....why....because you are black and poor

You can't get a good education.....why...because you are black and poor

I guess I could go on and on in this way but then it may get too black and white for some peoples liking.

The issue at hand is, as I said, exclusion: social, financial and educational. Black people at this rate never had a future in this country....be that Britain, Holland, Belgium, Germany or France for that matter. They were welcome while it suited the country but now things are different.

For the working classes thing were always different....

"Working class and poor white males living in Britain during the Imperial period could always view themselves as better than those peoples ruled in the British Empire. After the Second World War they began to encounter non-whites where they lived for the first time, and found that whatever attitudes towards non-whites they were not superior to them, and they had to compete with them for jobs, housing, and even mates."³⁶

This opinion gave rise to more extreme forms of letting the immigrants know they were not welcome. Harassment, intimidation, attacks which have invariably led to mass outbursts of protest, Notting Hill, Brixton, France most recently, and the rise of the populist right on the other hand adding fuel to the fire.

On the migrants side is the question of how to fight back and the fight has taken on a new dimension in present day society.

The once so called poverty and isolation of former days has expanded to engulf 4 generations of migrants. This has led to the growth of groups who seek dialogue for

³⁶ **The Notting Hill Riots and British National Identity. Mr Tim Helbing, at Indiana University**

change and there are invariably those who believe that the time for dialogue has long passed.

Those who no longer seek communication have put up the excuse that they are defending their culture and or motherland from the atrocities which modern day capitalism has brought with it. They are fighting immorality or impoverishment. The means are extreme but the cause justifies their actions.

But the vast majority of the migrants want a less extremist approach to tackle the causes of their problems, this does not mean they are not prepared to defend themselves from harassment or intimidation. It also does not mean they will idly stand by whilst their beliefs are trampled on or that their places of worship or education are burnt down or attacked.

In the majority of communities there is a genuine need for better understanding of each other. People are prepared to link up in dialogue in order to create change. The primary vision which I have is that there is a need for old fashioned community building.

The last 20 years have seen a huge growth in individualism. I count we don't.....this has left more people excluded from playing a role in society than ever before.

The divide between rich and poor has not grown smaller....so much so that in Holland food stamps and soup kitchens have been making a reappearance.

What has changed is the attitude towards the poor, the elderly the immigrants who in turn are seen to be the cause of all that is wrong...the poor don't work...they leech off society, the elderly are a burden on society they stay in jobs the young could have and bleed the health service dry, and the country can no longer afford to nor wants to pay their pensions. And the immigrants well they never belonged here anyway.

Solidarity towards the weaker sections of society has given way to the hard line. Those who can look after themselves better shut up and do so.

Those who protest over the situation are themselves extremists. Animal rights activists, anarchists, squatters and civil rights protestors are amongst those who have been labelled as terrorists...whether they did something or not.

In the communities this rise in intolerance towards each other has led to more and deeper estrangement.

My vision is that there has to be a radical change in the way in which we are tackling the problems around integration, inclusion and deprivation.

We have to readdress the way in which local authorities tackle the problems of deprivation by adopting policies which engage the communities which they serve in true debate in order to facilitate change.

Policies and actions should encourage the participation of all in society in a radical debate on community building. Knowing that you are part of a society which involves, not a voice on the sidelines, will work to bring communities closer to each other.

But let me be clear lets not go down the road of multiculturalism of which the idea is if you eat foreign food or listen to foreign music you have done your bit. Inclusion means that you accept differences and also see the strengths of working together.

Alongside this more has to be done to involve minoritiesnot just superficially but in the workplace as an equal. There is an urgent need to tackle the root of the problems which have made it possible to exclude minorities from the workplace.

Education has to adapt to the demands of the day. More has to be done to give children (especially minorities) the opportunity to participate as equals. Addressing the problems which children have at the outset can lead to better opportunity in the future. Coupled with a serious policy to encourage and facilitate diversity will pave the way to a better understanding of each other.

The Euro-centric model does not have the depth of vision which truly reflects in a model of inclusion. It merely clouds over the more questionable incidents in European history. A new model which accepts the strength of all in society...including easterners

To move forward from the situation in which war is being waged we have to adapt to a model of facilitating peace through debate and participation. This also means that there has to be a serious re-evaluation of how local authorities spend funds and how we invest in society.

Short term solutions and short term projects will not lead to long term change so we have to be prepared to make long term goals and provide adequate financing.

I do believe that it is possible to create safer communities In order to achieve this it is imperative to work together. Mutual understanding and respect paves the way to a united stance against those who would breed on fear and intolerance.

In the past few years I have been working with minority groups and have been surprised time and again how difficult it has been to move forward.

I have been taken aback at times by the intransigence of local authorities and local agencies such as social work, housing corporations and welfare organisations.

Whilst they seek to open dialogue with minority groups they fail to see that they are not communicating with these groups.

So it was that the provincial organ for tackling and spreading awareness on domestic violence failed to pick up on signals that the Turkish community in Hoogezand wanted to spread information on the subject. The professionals were at that time setting up a seminar and regretted the fact that minority groups were for them unreachable. Had they read their e-mails and taken the Turkish community seriously perhaps the dialogue would have started sooner.

Fortunately some of my criticisms have not fallen on deaf ears.

Projects which aim to improve communication are being set up. Bridges are being built.

It is a slow process to re-establish a trustworthy relationship with people who are on the whole bereft of trust when it comes to institutions, authorities or for that matter community workers.

With the cooperation and investment from the local authority and housing corporation along side the willingness to cooperate to address welfare problems which minority groups are facing progress is being made.

The challenge has been in being able to look further than your own remit and to dare to cooperate on an inter-agency level. In this way it has been possible to link up with small groups in their own environment.

This has meant simply a new form of organisation for the local authority and for partners. It asks for a flexible working style in which room is made for the client and time is taken to establish a trusting relationship. It is in this way that more can be done to combat estrangement.

Finally, I would like to state true change can only be guaranteed if more is done in mutual cooperation to tackle the issues of: poverty, bad housing, health, isolation, drugs abuse and anti social behaviour. These issues are not new...they are the same issues which any community group has to tackle. What is different is that we have to accept that we have to work on the ethos of intercultural understanding. Understanding not isolation is the key to mutual cooperation.